How near-miss events amplify or attenuate risky decision making

Management Science

Volumn 58, Issue 9, 2012, Pages 1596-1613

  Tinsley, Catherine H ^a   Dillon, Robin L ^a   Cronin, Matthew A ^b  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Decision making; Hurricanes; Natural disasters; Near miss; Oil spills; Organizational hazards; Risk

Indexed keywords

CONTRIBUTING FACTOR; DEEPWATER; HURRICANE SEASON; MAN-MADE DISASTERS; NATURAL DISASTERS; NEAR MISS; OIL DRILLING; POTENTIAL HAZARDS;

DECISION MAKING; DISASTERS; HURRICANES; OIL SPILLS; OIL WELL DRILLING; RISKS;

HAZARDS;

EID: 84866375951     PISSN: 00251909     EISSN: 15265501     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1120.1517     Document Type: Article

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