These lives will not be lost in vain: Organizational learning from disaster in U.S. coal mining

Organization Science

Volumn 20, Issue 5, 2009, Pages 861-875

  Madsen, Peter M ^a  

^a BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Disaster; High reliability organizations; Organizational learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 77049089733     PISSN: 10477039     EISSN: 15265455     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/orsc.1080.0396     Document Type: Article

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