The impact of political connections on firms' operating performance and financing decisions

Journal of Financial Research

Volumn 35, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 397-423

  Boubakri, Narjess ^a   Cosset, Jean Claude ^b   Saffar, Walid ^c  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF SHARJAH   (United Arab Emirates)

^b HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^c HONG KONG POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84866284970     PISSN: 02702592     EISSN: 14756803     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6803.2012.01322.x     Document Type: Article

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