Evolution of cooperation and skew under imperfect information

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 109, Issue 37, 2012, Pages 14936-14941

  Akçay, Erol ^a   Meirowitz, Adam ^a   Ramsay, Kristopher W ^a   Levin, Simon A ^a  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cheap talk bargaining; Incentive compatibility; Other regarding preferences; Reproductive transactions; Social evolution

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BEHAVIOR; COOPERATION; ECONOMIC ASPECT; GAME; HUMAN; INFORMATION; MECHANISM DESIGN; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; PRODUCTIVITY; REPRODUCTION; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL EVOLUTION; SOCIAL INTERACTION; STUDY DESIGN;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COMPUTER SIMULATION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GENETIC FITNESS; HUMANS; MODELS, THEORETICAL; REPRODUCTION; UNCERTAINTY;

EID: 84866276965     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1212925109     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. Trivers RL (1971) The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Q Rev Biol 46:35-57.
2. Axelrod R, Hamilton WD (1981) The evolution of cooperation. Science 211:1390-1396.
3. Sachs JL, Mueller UG, Wilcox TP, Bull JJ (2004) The evolution of cooperation. Q Rev Biol 79:135-160.
4. Lehmann L, Keller L (2006) The evolution of cooperation and altruism-a general framework and a classification of models. J Evol Biol 19:1365-1376.
5. Levin SA (2009) Games, Groups, and the Global Good (Springer Series in Game Theory), ed Levin SA (Springer, Berlin), pp 143-153.
6. Levin SA (2010) Crossing scales, crossing disciplines: Collective motion and collective action in the Global Commons. Philos Trans R Soc B 365:13-18.
7. Zahavi A (1975) Mate selection: A selection for a handicap. J Theor Biol 53:205-214.
8. Grafen A (1990) Biological signals as handicaps. J Theor Biol 144:517-546.
9. Godfray HCJ (1991) Signalling of need by offspring to their parents. Nature 352:328-330.
10. McNamara JM, Gasson C, Houston AI (1999) Incorporating rules for responding into evolutionary games. Nature 401:368-371.
11. Parker GA, Rubenstein DI (1981) Role assessment, reserve strategy and acquisition of information in asymmetric animal conflicts. Anim Behav 29:221-240.
12. McCarty NA, Meirowitz A (2007) Political Game Theory: An Introduction (Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK).
13. Vehrencamp SL (1983) Optimal degree of skew in cooperative societies. Am Zool 23:327-335.
14. Nonacs P, Hager R (2011) The past, present and future of reproductive skew theory and experiments. Biol Rev Camb Philos Soc 86:271-298.
15. Reeve HK, Ratnieks FLW (1993) Queen Number and Sociality in Insects, ed Keller L (Oxford Univ Press, Oxford), pp 45-85.
16. Johnstone RA (2000) Models of reproductive skew: A review and synthesis. Ethology 106:5-26.
17. Kokko H (2003) Are reproductive skew models evolutionarily stable? Proc R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 270:265-270.
18. Frank S (1998) Foundations of Social Evolution (Princeton Univ Press, Princeton).
19. Johnstone RA (2008) Kin selection, local competition, and reproductive skew. Evolution 62:2592-2599.
20. Myerson R, Satterthwaite M (1983) Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. J Econ Theory 29:265-281.
21. Myerson R (1979) Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica 47:61-74.
22. Queller DC (1992) Quantitative genetics, inclusive fitness, and group selection. Am Nat 139:540-558.
23. Nöldeke G, Samuelson L (1999) How costly is the honest signaling of need? J Theor Biol 197:527-539.
24. Roughgarden J, Song Z (2013) Human Nature, Early Experience and the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptedness, eds Narvaez D, Panksepp J, Schore A, Gleason T (Oxford Univ Press, New York).
25. Akçay E (2012) Incentives in the family ii: Behavioral dynamics and the evolution of non-costly signaling. J Theor Biol 294:9-18.
26. Reeve HK, Emlen ST, Keller L (1998) Reproductive sharing in animal societies: Reproductive incentives or incomplete control by dominant breeders? Behav Ecol 9:267-278.
27. Spence M (1973) Job market signaling. Q J Econ 87:355-374.
28. Bergstrom CT, Lachmann M (1998) Signaling among relatives. III. Talk is cheap. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 95:5100-5105.
29. Worden L, Levin SA (2007) Evolutionary escape from the prisoner's dilemma. J Theor Biol 245:411-422.
30. Akçay E, Roughgarden J (2011) The evolution of payoff matrices: Providing incentives to cooperate. Proc Biol Sci 278:2198-2206.
31. Clutton-Brock TH (1998) Reproductive skew, concessions and limited control. Trends Ecol Evol 13:288-292.
32. Chatterjee K, Samuelson W (1983) Bargaining under incomplete information. Oper Res 31:835-851.
33. Nonacs P, Liebert A, Starks P (2006) Transactional skew and assured fitness return models fail to predict patterns of cooperation in wasps. Am Nat 167:467-480.
34. Field J, Cronin A, Bridge C (2006) Future fitness and helping in social queues. Nature 441:214-217.
35. Leadbeater E, Carruthers J, Green J, Rosser N, Field J (2011) Nest inheritance is the missing source of direct fitness in a primitively eusocial insect. Science 333:874-876.
36. Fehr E, Gächter S (2000) Fairness and retaliation: The economics of reciprocity. J Econ Perspect 14(3):159-181.
37. Sobel J (2005) Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. J Econ Lit 43:392-436.