Living originalism and living constitutionalism as moral readings of the American constitution

Boston University Law Review

Volumn 92, Issue 4, 2012, Pages 1171-1185

  Fleming, James E ^a  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84866130984     PISSN: 00068047     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (53)

1. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011).
2. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
3. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 29 (1988).
4. See JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 10, 41, 61-72, 94-101, 235-39 (2011) (developing a protestant theory, which argues that no institution of government, especially the Supreme Court, has a monopoly on the authority to interpret the Constitution and stresses the role of popular movements in interpreting the Constitution);
5. See James E. Fleming, The Balkinization of Originalism, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 669.
6. See, e.g., ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1 (2011).
7. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 176-77, 351-55 (1990) (criticizing Dworkin's view and arguing that the "attempt to define individual liberties by abstract moral philosophy" involves succumbing to the "temptations of Utopia", that is, reading one's own vision of Utopia into the Constitution); see also id. at 167 (critiquing "[t]he notion of a 'living Constitution'");
8. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38-47 (1997) (critiquing "The Living Constitution"); id. at 144-49 (critiquing Dworkin's "moral reading" of the Constitution).
9. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann, Preface to Scalia, supra note 10, at xi-xii (stating that Dworkin "defends a different version of originalism from Justice Scalia's", according to which constitutional provisions '"set out abstract principles rather than concrete or dated rules'");
10. Keith E. Whittington, Dworkin's "Originalism": The Role of Intentions in Constitutional Interpretation, 62 REV. POL. 197, 201 (2000) (interpreting Dworkin as an "originalist" who argues that the Founders chose abstract principles).
11. See Randy E. Barnett, Underlying Principles, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 405 (2007)
12. (reviewing Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007)).
13. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 855, 862-63 (1989).
14. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 1-10 (1977).
15. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & JAMES E. FLEMING, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: THE BASIC QUESTIONS 84-91 (2007).
16. see also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89-94 (2004) (explaining the movement to, and advantages of, original meaning originalism).
17. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1171-73 n. 32 (1993) (developing a broad originalist conception of fidelity as "translation", under which constitutional interpretation must encompass both text and context).
18. Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 599, 607-12 (2004) (characterizing "the new originalism" as focused on creating a "basis for positive constitutional doctrine" and concentrating on fidelity to public meaning at the time of ratification, not judicial "restraint" or deference to democratic processes).
19. See Amy Gutmann, Preface to SCALIA, supra note 10, at xi-xii;
20. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is Bunk, 84 N. Y. U. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2009).
21. See RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 7-12, 74-76 (1996) [hereinafter DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW];
22. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 125-29 (1993). I take the term "integrity" from Dworkin's conception of "law as integrity."
23. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-275 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE].
24. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 35, at 255 ("Judges who accept the interpretive ideal of integrity decide hard cases by trying to find, in some coherent set of principles about people's rights and duties, the best constructive interpretation of the political structure and legal doctrine of their community. They try to make that complex structure and record the best these can be.").
25. JAMES E. FLEMING, SECURING CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: THE CASE OF AUTONOMY 16 (2006).
26. 17 U. S. 316, 407 (1819) (conceiving the Constitution as marking "great outlines", not enumerating details with the "prolixity of a legal code").
27. 319 U. S. 624, 639 (1943) (conceiving the Constitution's commitments in the Bill of Rights as "majestic generalities").
28. Omychund v. Barker, (1744), 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23 (Ch.);
29. 1 Atk. 21, 34.
30. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 35, at 176-275 (developing a theory of "law as integrity");
31. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 35, at 255.
32. See James E. Fleming, Rewriting Brown, Resurrecting Plessy, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1141, 1149-52 (2008). In this section I draw from that piece.
33. David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1065 (2008).
34. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 18 (1958).
35. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1372-81 (1997).
36. and WALTER F. MURPHY, JAMES E. FLEMING, SOTIRIOS A. BARBER & STEPHEN MACEDO, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION V (4th ed. 2008).
37. U. S. CONST, art. VI, § 2;
38. Cooper, 358 U. S. at 18.
39. 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
40. Cooper, 358 U. S. at 18.
41. Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 987 (1987).
42. Cf. Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (1987).
43. Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 23, 26 (1994);
44. Gary Lawson, Mostly Unconstitutional: The Case Against Precedent Revisited, 5 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 17 (2007).
45. See, e.g., DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 35, at 2.
46. See DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 35, at 379-92.
47. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891 (1996).
48. see also David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 1457 (2001).
49. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 20-24 (2006) (deploring the difficulty of amending the Constitution through Article V procedures).
50. See James E. Fleming, We the Unconventional American People, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513, 1533-34 (1998)
51. (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998)). I draw from that analysis here.
52. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutional Amendmentitis, AM. PROSPECT, Fall 1995, at 20 (criticizing a rash of proposals to amend the Constitution).
53. LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 183-87, 213-19 (2004).