Being polite is a handicap: Towards a game theoretical analysis of polite linguistic behavior

Proceedings of the 9th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, TARK 2003

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 45-58

  Van Rooy, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LINGUISTICS;

GAME THEORETICAL ANALYSIS; SIGNALING GAME;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 84865832891     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/846241.846248     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (24)

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