Justice Stevens and the Chevron puzzle

Northwestern University Law Review

Volumn 106, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 551-566

  Merrill, Thomas W ^a  

^a The Earth Institute at Columbia University   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84865626994     PISSN: 00293571     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Note

References (90)

1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. This and all following citation counts are based on Westlaw searches conducted on July 28, 2011.
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
4. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
5. In addition, Chevron has also been cited in 30 American Law Reports articles, 58 Westlaw journals, and over 3600 miscellaneous other pieces of legal authority including digests, practice guides, circulars, and practitioner's handbooks.
6. Bruce A. Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 272 n.4 (1977).
7. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
8. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale L.J. 2580, 2589 (2006).
9. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
10. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
11. Especially notable is Kathryn A. Watts, From Chevron to Massachusetts: Justice Stevens's Approach to Securing the Public Interest, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1021, 1040 (2010). Professor Watts argues that Justice Stevens deferred to agency interpretations when a statute contains conflicting purposes (Chevron) but not when the statute contains a single dominant purpose (Massachusetts). The problem with this is that every statute contains a least two purposes: a desire to achieve a goal and a desire to limit pursuit of that goal after some point. If it is unclear where Congress drew the line, then deference should be in order.
12. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 788 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting); City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 348 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); (discussing Massachusetts v. EPA).
14. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992).
15. E.g., Richard A. Posner, How Judges Think 40, 246-48 (2010).
16. The connection between the common law style of judging and aggressive judicial review of questions of law finds an early and articulate proponent in John Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law in the United States (1927). See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 939, 972-79 (2011) (discussing Dickinson's influence on the development of the appellate review model of administrative law).
17. Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Sometimes Great Cases Are Made Not Born, in Statutory Interpretation Stories, 166-68 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al. eds., 2011).
18. For further explication of integrative interpretation, see Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 Lewis &Clark L. Rev. 1565, 1569-72 (2010).
19. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 Yale L.J. 969, 1018-19 (1992).
20. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) ("[A] practice has peculiar weight when it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion.... ").
21. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Cent. Lincoln Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380, 390 (1984) (noting the "technical and complex" nature of the subject matter and the agency's particular expertise).
22. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that an administrator's determination should be weighed upon "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade").
23. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 549, 562 (1985).
24. See generally Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation (2006) (urging a super-strong version of the Chevron doctrine based on principles of comparative institutional choice analysis).
25. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 881 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. 187, 196-97 (2006).
26. E.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89-90 (2007) (Breyer, J.) (departing from two-step process prescribed by Chevron for "purposes of exposition"); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (Breyer, J.) (considering multiple factors in applying Chevron); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 596 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Chevron made no relevant change. "); Steven Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 368 (1986).
27. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
28. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1443, 1464 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Introduction: Mead in the Trenches, 71 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 347, 355-56 (2003).
29. The mandate from Congress is widely acknowledged to be implicit because the express signals Congress has given generally cut in favor of independent judicial judgment rather than deference. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 Geo. L.J. 833, 881 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 Va. L. Rev. (2006), at 870-72.
30. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
31. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 844 (1984).
32. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (1984).
33. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (1984).
34. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (1984).
35. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (1984).
36. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. at 865-66 (1984).
37. Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Sometimes Great Cases Are Made Not Born, in Statutory Interpretation Stories, at 180-84.
38. Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.: Sometimes Great Cases Are Made Not Born, in Statutory Interpretation Stories, at 180-84.
39. INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987); see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 531 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701-02 (2004).
40. Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency Decisions, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 799, 821-24 (2010).
41. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J. 511, 516.
42. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (Justice Stevens joining Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court without comment); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (Justice Stevens joining Justice Souter's opinion for the Court without comment); cf. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Assoc. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that subordination of a court of appeals to agency interpretations under Chevron may not apply to Supreme Court interpretations, but offering no reason for the distinction); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 595 n.2 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissenting on the merits and stating in one unelaborated footnote that he agrees with Justice Breyer about the meaning and significance of Chevron).
43. See Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 471 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 245 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 417 (2012).
45. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
46. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. 417 (2012).
47. See ("Justice Stevens himself would look back to Hampton occasionally as authority for the more abstract proposition that government must 'govern impartially' and for the claim that restrictions on constitutional interests can be authorized only on the basis of real, not hypothesized, justifications for the government's actions. " (footnote omitted).
48. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
49. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
50. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
51. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
52. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
53. See Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 Nw. U. L. Rev. (2012), at 443-47.
54. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
55. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
56. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
57. Matthew D. Adler, Against "Individual Risk": A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1121, 1128 (2005).
58. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 640-43.
59. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 640-43.
60. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 640-43.
61. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
62. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
63. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
64. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
65. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006).
67. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528-29.
68. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 528-29.
69. Linda Greenhouse, The High Court's Target: Congress, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 2001, at WK3.
70. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 529, 532-33 (majority opinion).
71. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 351, 365-68 (1994).
72. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 504-05.
73. 548 U.S. 557 (2005).
74. See also Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
75. 548 U.S. at 566.
76. 548 U.S. at 566.
77. 548 U.S. at 566.
78. 548 U.S. at 566.
79. 548 U.S. at 566.
80. 548 U.S. at 566.
81. 548 U.S. at 566.
82. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 597 (1992).
83. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
84. See Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 Ind. L.J. 1145, 1148-52, 1167 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1681, 1686-87 (2005).
85. See Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (bubble prohibited under the nonattainment provisions of the Act); Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 395-401 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (bubble required under the Prevention of Significant Deterioration provisions of the Act); ASARCO Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 329 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (bubble prohibited under the new source review provisions of the Clean Air Act).
86. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 854-59 (1984).
87. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
88. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas are most clearly in the institutional choice camp. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713-14 (2011) (Roberts, C.J.) (explicating Chevron and Mead and holding that interpretation of tax statute by Treasury Department regulation should be reviewed under Chevron rather than pre-Chevron precedent); Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Asssoc. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982-84 (2005) (Thomas, J.) (explicating Chevron and Mead and holding that agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes supersede judicial interpretations); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587-88 (2000) (Thomas, J.) (adopting analysis that anticipates Mead). Justice Kennedy should likewise be included in this camp. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 107 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (criticizing Justice Breyer for "invert[ing] Chevron's logical progression"); United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 390-92 (1999) (Kennedy, J.) (extending Chevron to regulations adopted under statute expressly conferring de novo review on courts). His opinion for the Court in Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 258-260 (2006), is arguably equilibrium preserving in spirit but in form is consistent with the institutional choice perspective. Justice Alito has rarely written about Chevron, although he appears sympathetic to resolving cases based on Chevron deference. See Nat'l Assoc. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 665-67 (2007) (Alito, J.) (adopting broad reading of Chevron in sustaining agency's reconciliation of apparently conflicting statutory directives); Zuni, 550 U.S. at 107 (Kennedy, J., joined by Alito, J., concurring) (criticizing Justice Breyer for "invert[ing]" Chevron). Justice Ginsburg is wary of categorical statements about agency interpretation but in practice is relatively deferential to agency interpretation. See, e.g., Astrue v. Capato, 80 U.S.L.W. 4369 (U.S. May 21, 2012) (No. 11-159) (Ginsburg, J.) (deferring to agency under Chevron); Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 243-44 (2001) (Ginsburg, J.) (same); Regions Hosp. v. Shalala, 522 U.S. 448, 457-64 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.) (same); Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 274-75 (1996) (deferring to agency without expressly invoking Chevron). She can perhaps be classified as institutional choice lite.
89. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke L.J., at 520-21.
90. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 201, 249-57; Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2374-83 (2001).