Cognitive processes in decisions under risk are not the same as in decisions under uncertainty

Frontiers in Neuroscience

Volumn , Issue JULY, 2012, Pages 1-6

  Volz, Kirsten G ^a   Gigerenzer, Gerd ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TÜBINGEN   (Germany)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

Author keywords

As if versus process models; Heuristics; Neuroscience of decision making; Risk and uncertainty; Small world versus large world problems

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COGNITION; CONFLICT; DECISION MAKING; EVOLUTION; HUMAN; NEUROSCIENCE; RISK; UNCERTAINTY;

EID: 84865176518     PISSN: 16624548     EISSN: 1662453X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fnins.2012.00105     Document Type: Article

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