Pluralistic physicalism and the causal exclusion argument

European Journal for Philosophy of Science

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 219-232

  Eronen, Markus I ^a  

^a RUHR UNIVERSITY BOCHUM   (Germany)

Author keywords

Causal exclusion; Explanatory pluralism; Interventionism; Physicalism; Pluralistic physicalism; Robustness

Indexed keywords

EID: 84863533694     PISSN: 18794912     EISSN: 18794920     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13194-011-0041-7     Document Type: Article

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