Contingent prize allocation and pivotal voting

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 371-392

  Smith, Alastair ^a   Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84863287838     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: 14692112     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123411000342     Document Type: Review

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