Political yardstick competition among Italian municipalities on spending decisions

Annals of Regional Science

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 213-235

  Bartolini, David ^a   Santolini, Raffaella ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÀ POLITECNICA DELLE MARCHE   (Italy)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TERAMO   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK; ELECTION; NUMERICAL MODEL; POLITICAL SYSTEM; SPATIAL ANALYSIS;

EID: 84863089664     PISSN: 05701864     EISSN: 14320592     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00168-011-0437-5     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. Allers M, Elhorst JP (2005) Tax mimicking and yardstick competition among local governments in the Netherlands. Int Tax Public Finance 12: 493-513.
2. Anderson TW, Hsiao C (1981) Estimation of dynamic models with error components. J Am Stat Assoc 76(375): 598-606.
3. Anderson TW, Hsiao C (1982) Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using panel data. J Econometr 18(1): 47-82.
4. Anselin L (1988) Spatial econometrics: methods and models. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
5. Arellano M, Bond S (1991) Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Rev Econ Stud 58(2): 277-297.
6. Arellano M, Bover O (1995) Another look at the instrumental variable estimation of error-components models. J Econometr 68(1): 29-51.
7. Baicker K (2005) The spillover effects of the state spending. J Public Econ 89: 529-544.
8. Baum CF, Schaffer ME, Stillman S (2003) Instrumental variables and GMM: Estimation and testing. Stata J 3: 1-31. Working Paper 545, Boston College.
9. Besley T, Case A (1995) Incumbent behavior: vote-seeking, tax setting, and yardstick competition. Am Econ Rev 85: 25-45.
10. Blundell R, Bond S (1998) Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models. J Econometr 87(1): 115-143.
11. Blundell R, Bond S (2000) Gmm estimation with persistent panel data: an application to production functions. Econometr Rev 19(3): 321-340.
12. Bond SR, Hoeffler A, Temple J (2001) Gmm estimation of empirical growth models. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 3048.
13. Bordignon M, Cerniglia F, Revelli F (2003) In search of yardstick competition: a spatial analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting. J Urban Econ 54(2): 199-217.
14. Bowsher CG (2002) On testing overidentifying restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Econ Lett 77(2): 211-220.
15. Brennan G, Buchanan JM (1980) The power to tax: analytical foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
16. Brueckner JK (2003) Strategic interaction among Governments: an overview of empirical studies. Int Reg Sci Rev 26: 175-188.
17. Case A (1993) Interstate tax competition after tra86. J Policy Anal Manage 12(1): 136-148.
18. Case A, Hines JR, Rosen HS (1993) Budget spill-over and fiscal policy interdependence-evidence from the States. J Public Econ 52: 258-307.
19. Devereux MP, Lockwood B, Redoano M (2007) Horizontal and vertical indirect tax competition: theory and some evidence from the USA. J Public Econ 91(3-4): 451-479.
20. Elhorst JP, Fréret S (2009) Evidence of political yardstick competition in France using a two-regime spatial Durbin model with fixed effects. J Reg Sci 49(5): 931-951.
21. Ermini B, Santolini R (2010) Local expenditure interaction in Italian municipalities. Do local council partnerships make a difference?. Local Govern Stud 36: 655-677.
22. Foucault M, Madies T, Paty S (2008) Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities. Public Choice 137: 57-80.
23. Franzese RJ (2000) Electoral and partisan manipulation of public debt in developed democracies, 1956-1990. In: Strauch R, Von Hagen J (eds) Institutions, politics and fiscal policy. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 61-83.
24. Heyndels B, Vuchelen J (1998) Tax mimicking among Belgian municipalities. Natl Tax J 51: 89-101.
25. Jacobs JPAM, Lighthart JE, Vrijburg H (2007) Consumption tax competition among governments: evidence from the United States. Int Tax Public Finance 17: 271-294.
26. Jacobs JPAM, Ligthart JE, Vrijburg H (2009) Dynamic panel data models featuring endogenous interaction and spatially correlated errors. Center Discussion Paper No. 2009-92.
27. Kelejian HH, Prucha IR (1998) A generalized spatial two stage least squares procedure for estimating a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbances. J Real Estate Finance Econ 17: 99-121.
28. Kukenova M, Monteiro JA (2009) Spatial dynamic panel model and system GMM: a Monte Carlo investigation. MPRA Working Paper No. 14319.
29. Ladd HF (1992) Mimicking of local tax burdens among neighboring counties. Public Finance Q 20: 450-467.
30. Patrizii V, Rapallini C, Zito G (2006) I "patti" di stabilità interni. Riv diritto finanziario sci delle finanze 65: 1-2006.
31. Revelli F (2001) Spatial patterns in local taxation: tax mimicking or error mimicking?. Appl Econ 33: 1101-1107.
32. Roodman D (2009) A note on the theme of too many instruments. Oxford Bull Econ Stat 71: 135-158.
33. Ruiz FMM, Gerard M (2008) Is there evidence of strategic corporate tax interaction among EU countries? MPRA Working Paper 10094.
34. Salmon P (1987) Decentralisation as an incentive scheme. Oxford Rev Econ Policy 3(2): 24-43.
35. Santolini R (2008) A spatial cross-sectional analysis of political trend in the Italian municipalities. Pap Reg Sci 87: 431-451.
36. Santolini R (2009) The political trend in local government tax setting. Public Choice 139(1-2): 125-134.
37. Solé-Ollé A (2003) Electoral accountability and tax mimicking: the effects of electoral margins, coalition government, and ideology. Eur J Polit Econ 19: 685-713.
38. Solé-Ollé A (2006) Expenditure spillovers and fiscal interactions: empirical evidence from local governments in spain. J Urban Econ 59(1): 32-53.
39. Sutherland D, Price R, Joumard I (2005) Fiscal rules for sub-central governments. OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 465.
40. Veiga LG, Veiga FJ (2007) Political business cycles at the municipal level. Public Choice 131: 45-64.
41. Verbeek M (2008) A guide to modern econometrics, 3rd edn. Wiley, New York.