Choosing the rules for consensus standardization

RAND Journal of Economics

Volumn 43, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 235-252

  Farrell, Joseph ^a   Simcoe, Timothy ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862649495     PISSN: 07416261     EISSN: 17562171     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00164.x     Document Type: Article

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