Peace with Hamas? The transforming potential of political participation

International Affairs

Volumn 80, Issue 2, 2004, Pages

  Gunning, Jeroen ^a  

^a ABERYSTWYTH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84862343342     PISSN: 00205850     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00381.x     Document Type: Article

References (104)

1. The only other organization besides Hamas with the capacity seriously to stall the peace process is the Al-Aqsa Brigade and its affiliates. The PFLP and Islamic jihad are too small to have a sustained, significant effect if Hamas and the Brigade were to accept a negotiated compromise. Since the Al-Aqsa Brigade is affiliated to the ruling Fatah movement, it is more likely that it will be 'brought into line' with an eventual peace deal than is currently the case with Hamas. I will therefore focus exclusively on Hamas in this article.
2. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 169-71. Similar conclusions can be found in the main texts on Hamas: Khaled Hroub, Hamas (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000); Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic politics in Palestine (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996); Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994); Andrea Nüsse, Muslim Palestine (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1998). See also Graham Usher, 'What kind of nation?', Race and Class 37: 2, 1995.
3. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 169-71. Similar conclusions can be found in the main texts on Hamas: Khaled Hroub, Hamas (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000); Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic politics in Palestine (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996); Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994); Andrea Nüsse, Muslim Palestine (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1998). See also Graham Usher, 'What kind of nation?', Race and Class 37: 2, 1995.
4. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 169-71. Similar conclusions can be found in the main texts on Hamas: Khaled Hroub, Hamas (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000); Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic politics in Palestine (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996); Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994); Andrea Nüsse, Muslim Palestine (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1998). See also Graham Usher, 'What kind of nation?', Race and Class 37: 2, 1995.
5. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 169-71. Similar conclusions can be found in the main texts on Hamas: Khaled Hroub, Hamas (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000); Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic politics in Palestine (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996); Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994); Andrea Nüsse, Muslim Palestine (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1998). See also Graham Usher, 'What kind of nation?', Race and Class 37: 2, 1995.
6. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 169-71. Similar conclusions can be found in the main texts on Hamas: Khaled Hroub, Hamas (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000); Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic politics in Palestine (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996); Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994); Andrea Nüsse, Muslim Palestine (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1998). See also Graham Usher, 'What kind of nation?', Race and Class 37: 2, 1995.
7. Shaul Mishal and Avraham Sela, The Palestinian Hamas (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), pp. 169-71. Similar conclusions can be found in the main texts on Hamas: Khaled Hroub, Hamas (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000); Beverley Milton-Edwards, Islamic politics in Palestine (London: I. B. Tauris, 1996); Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994); Andrea Nüsse, Muslim Palestine (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic, 1998). See also Graham Usher, 'What kind of nation?', Race and Class 37: 2, 1995.
8. Hroub, Hamas, p. 259.
9. John Darby, The effects of violence on peace processes (Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2001), p. 48.
10. Marie-Joëlle Zahar, 'Reframing the spoiler debate in peace processes', in John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, eds, Contemporary peacemaking (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), p. 118.
11. Khaled Mish'al, chairman of Hamas's Political Bureau, confirmed in a 2002 interview that the political leadership of Hamas had regular contact with most European diplomatic missions.
12. Chris McGreal, 'UK recalls MI6 link to Palestinian militants', Guardian, 24 Sept. 2003, p. 14; see also Alistair Crooke and Beverley Milton-Edwards, 'Costly choice: Hamas, ceasefires and the Palestinian-Israeli peace process', World Today 59: 12, Nov. 2003, pp. 15-17.
13. Chris McGreal, 'UK recalls MI6 link to Palestinian militants', Guardian, 24 Sept. 2003, p. 14; see also Alistair Crooke and Beverley Milton-Edwards, 'Costly choice: Hamas, ceasefires and the Palestinian-Israeli peace process', World Today 59: 12, Nov. 2003, pp. 15-17.
14. See Sharon's comment at the Fourth Herzliya Conference, 18 Dec. 2003: 'Without the achievement of full security within the framework of which terror organizations will be dismantled it will not be possible to achieve genuine peace, a peace for generations. This is the essence of the Roadmap.' http://www.mfa.gov.il/ma/go.asp?MFAHO0350 (accessed 16 Jan. 2004).
15. See comments by Sharon's adviser Don Gold, reported by Chris McGreal, in 'Sharon shies away from killing Hamas ideologue', Guardian, 13 June 2003, p. 19.
16. Eric Silver, 'Israel urges EU to freeze assets of Hamas funders', Independent on Sunday, 24 Aug. 2003, p. 19.
17. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/; see also the text of the US-authored 'road map', http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm.
18. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/; see also the text of the US-authored 'road map', http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm.
19. Failure or success apart, the attempt raises important ethical and human rights issues. I will not engage with these in this article.
20. '2003 Terrorism Review', 8 Jan. 2004, http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il (accessed 16 Jan. 2004).
21. See Chris McGreal, 'International roundup: Hamas defiant Palestinians shocked at use of suicide mother', Guardian, 27 Jan. 2004., p. 18.
22. See Ely Karmon, 'Hamas' terrorism strategy: operational limitations and political constraints', Middle East Review of International Affairs 4: 1, 2000, pp. 66-76.
23. As in the mass incarcerations or deportations of 1989, 1992 and 1096, and the targeted assassinations of the late 1990s and the Al-Aqsa intifada.
24. Poll no. 9, Palestine Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), 7-14 Oct. 2003.
25. A senior member of Hamas's military wing was quoted as saying: 'After every massacre, every massive violation of our rights and defilement of our holy places, it is easy for us to sweep the streets for boys who want to do martyrdom operations. Fending off the crowds who demand revenge and retaliation and insist on a human bombing operation - that becomes our biggest problem!' Nasra Hassan, 'An arsenal of believers', The New Yorker, 19 Nov. 2001.
26. Studies focusing on Hamas tend to be primarily empirical while analyses made within the framework of peacemaking studies (on which I will primarily focus) are typically weak on empirical detail. This paper seeks to draw on the strength of both approaches, using evidence drawn from personal interviews, written documents and popular surveys.
27. See e.g. the (contested) argument that the Northern Ireland peace process has stagnated because Sinn Fein is a 'front' subservient to the IRA rather than a 'wing' with a significant separate power base: Anthony Richards, 'Terrorist groups and political fronts', Terrorism and Political Violence 13: 4, 2001.
28. Jeffrey Ross and Ted Gurr, 'Why terrorism subsides', Comparative Politics 21: 4, 1989, p. 408.
29. See e.g. the anthology edited by Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer, Terrorism and counterterrorism (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill, 2003), or the emphasis in Paul Wilkinson's Terrorism versus democracy (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
30. See e.g. the anthology edited by Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer, Terrorism and counterterrorism (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill, 2003), or the emphasis in Paul Wilkinson's Terrorism versus democracy (London: Frank Cass, 2001).
31. Ross and Gurr, 'Why terrorism subsides', p. 409.
32. Martha Crenshaw, 'How terrorism declines', Terrorism and Political Violence 3: 1, 1991, pp. 86-7.
33. Ross and Gurr, 'Why terrorism subsides', pp. 409-10.
34. Ibid., pp. 409-10, 414.
35. See also the analyses in Roane Carey, ed., The new intifada: resisting Israel's apartheid (London: Verso, 2001); George Giacaman and Dag Lønning, eds, After Oslo (London: Pluto, 1998).
36. See also the analyses in Roane Carey, ed., The new intifada: resisting Israel's apartheid (London: Verso, 2001); George Giacaman and Dag Lønning, eds, After Oslo (London: Pluto, 1998).
37. Crenshaw, 'How terrorism declines', p. 81. Hamas does not appear to suffer from 'organizational overextension, inexperienced cadres, loss of leadership through defections as well as arrests [or] unrestrained factionalism', and only intermittently from 'poor strategic choices'. Arrests do affect Hamas but not to the extent of seriously weakening the organization due to the operational 'depth' of its membership.
38. The following paragraphs summarize Stephen Stedman, 'Spoiler problems in peace processes', International Security 22: 2, 1997, pp. 7-16.
39. The distinction between the latter two categories is often blurred; see critique in Darby, The effects of violence on peace processes, pp. 46-61.
40. Stedman, 'Spoiler problems in peace processes', p. 17. Stedman's sixth point, 'the likely effects of custodial action on the spoiler's willingness to continue aggression', is of a different nature and will be touched upon in the conclusion. Stedman also emphasizes the impact of the number of spoilers on the possible outcomes of a peace process. I will focus on Hamas alone for the reasons outlined in footnote 1.
41. Stephen Stedman, 'Peace processes and the challenges of violence', in Darby and Mac Ginty, eds, Contemporary peacemaking, p. 108.
42. Significantly, though this term implies the destruction of the State of Israel, no Hamas leader has ever called for genocide.
43. See Hroub, Hamas, pp. 59-86. For up-to-date positions, see http://www.palestine-info.co.uk.
44. See the discussion in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, pp. 72-82.
45. See Chris McGreal, 'Road map sowed seeds of ceasefire's destruction', Guardian, 23 Aug. 2003, p. 17. See also reports about the occurrence of splinter operations carried out in defiance of the ceasefire declarations of the various leaderships: 'Middle East: cease-fire producing splinter groups', 30 June 2003, http://www.stratfor.biz (accessed 1 Oct. 2003).
46. See Chris McGreal, 'Road map sowed seeds of ceasefire's destruction', Guardian, 23 Aug. 2003, p. 17. See also reports about the occurrence of splinter operations carried out in defiance of the ceasefire declarations of the various leaderships: 'Middle East: cease-fire producing splinter groups', 30 June 2003, http://www.stratfor.biz (accessed 1 Oct. 2003).
47. The period following 9/11 is the most obvious illustration of this point. Details may be found in my forthcoming book, The transformation of Hamas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
48. Crooke and Milton-Edwards list five ceasefire arrangements of which Hamas was part in recent times ('Costly choice', p. 16).
49. For example, the periods following 9/11 and in the aftermath of the June 2003 ceasefire collapse. A similar, though less successful, shift was discernible in the late 1990s.
50. Hamas's reading of the peace process is closely mirrored by the critiques offered in Carey, ed., The new intifada.
51. Zahar, 'Refraining the spoiler debate', p. 117.
52. See also Usher, 'What kind of nation?'. Tellingly, a recent survey found that Fatah supporters were more likely to support reconciliation and compromise than either Islamist supporters or unaligned Palestinians, suggesting a division between an in- and an out-crowd: see Jacob Shamir and Khalil Shikaki, 'Determinants of reconciliation and compromise among Israelis and Palestinians', Journal of Peace Research 39: 2, 2002, p. 197.
53. See also Usher, 'What kind of nation?'. Tellingly, a recent survey found that Fatah supporters were more likely to support reconciliation and compromise than either Islamist supporters or unaligned Palestinians, suggesting a division between an in- and an out-crowd: see Jacob Shamir and Khalil Shikaki, 'Determinants of reconciliation and compromise among Israelis and Palestinians', Journal of Peace Research 39: 2, 2002, p. 197.
54. An earlier version of this argument can be found in Jeroen Gunning, 'Hamas and the "Geneva Agreement": behind the headlines', RUSI Newsbrief 23: 11, Nov. 2003.
55. See also pp. 250-51 of this article.
56. Examples are the 1997 and 2003 closures of Islamic charities in Gaza, both of which resulted in near-humanitarian crises, forcing Arafat to allow the charities to reopen. See also Graham Usher, 'Building from the ruins', Palestine News, Winter 2003/4, p. 6.
57. Though Fatah's 'inside' leadership is more egalitarian than its formerly 'outside' counterpart, I still witnessed a difference between the overall political cultures of Fatah and Hamas. When interviewing groups of Hamas student members, I typically observed that the leader was respected but routinely criticized by members who appeared to regard themselves as his equals. Fatah student members, conversely, tended to look up to their leaders, while the leaders typically exuded an air of benevolent autocracy.
58. I develop this argument more fully in my forthcoming book (see n. 37)
59. See Hillel Frisch, Countdown to statehood (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998); Yezid Sayigh, Armed struggle and the search for state (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
60. See Hillel Frisch, Countdown to statehood (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998); Yezid Sayigh, Armed struggle and the search for state (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
61. Personal interviews with leaders from Hamas and the left (1998).
62. The majority of student leaders I have interviewed from 1998 onwards were pragmatic and accommodating in their approach to domestic politics.
63. The arguments of this paragraph are elaborated upon in my forthcoming book (see n. 37). For an early discussion of the initial research on which the book is based, see Jeroen Gunning, 'Re-thinking Western constructs of Islamism: pluralism, democracy and the theory and praxis of the Islamic movement in the Gaza Strip', PhD thesis, University of Durham, 2000.
64. An example is the restraint exercised in 1994 following the killing of 13 Hamas activists by security forces when the latter were still lacking in local legitimacy and relatively inexperienced.
65. See Dankwart Rustow, 'Transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model', Comparative Politics 2: 3, 1970; Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from authoritarian rule: tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the market: political and economic reforms in eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
66. See Dankwart Rustow, 'Transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model', Comparative Politics 2: 3, 1970; Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from authoritarian rule: tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the market: political and economic reforms in eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
67. See Dankwart Rustow, 'Transitions to democracy: toward a dynamic model', Comparative Politics 2: 3, 1970; Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from authoritarian rule: tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the market: political and economic reforms in eastern Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
68. See David Snow et al., 'Frame alignment process, micromobilization, and movement participation', American Sociological Review 51: 4, 1986; David Snow and Robert Benford, 'Master frames and cycles of protest', in Aldon Morris and Carol Mueller, eds, Frontiers in social movement theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
69. See David Snow et al., 'Frame alignment process, micromobilization, and movement participation', American Sociological Review 51: 4, 1986; David Snow and Robert Benford, 'Master frames and cycles of protest', in Aldon Morris and Carol Mueller, eds, Frontiers in social movement theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).
70. See Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a theory of practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
71. Examples are the 1990s election campaigns in Bir Zeit and Najah University.
72. Among them, Ismail Abu Shanab (assassinated in Aug. 2003), Usama Abu Hamdan, Khaled Mish'al, Mahmud Zahhar and Ismail Haniyyah. See also n. 62.
73. See Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi in Al-Risala, 3 July 2003, quoted in B. Chernitsky, The domestic Palestinian dispute over the hudna, Middle East Media Research Institute Inquiry and Analysis Series, no. 144.
74. See Abd al-Aziz al-Rantisi in Al-Risala, 3 July 2003, quoted in B. Chernitsky, The domestic Palestinian dispute over the hudna, Middle East Media Research Institute Inquiry and Analysis Series, no. 144.
75. See the arguments put forward in an intercepted Hamas document in Mishal and Sela, The Palestinian Hamas, pp. 122-30.
76. 'Details of terror attacks and attempted attacks since the June 29 "Hudna" ceasefire', http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il (accessed 16 Jan. 2004). The article details a number of other incidents during July, none of which, it claims, were carried out by Hamas. Moreover, it does not state that the attacks were claimed by particular organizations, just that they were carried out by members of Islamic Jihad or Fatah - begging the question whether the attacks were authorized.
77. Rantisi's recent offer of a ceasefire is quoted in Justin Huggler, 'Israel summarily rejects Hamas offer of 10-year truce', Independent, 27 Jan. 2004, p. 13. See also Seumas Milne, 'Too late for two states', Guardian, 24 Jan. 2004.
78. Rantisi's recent offer of a ceasefire is quoted in Justin Huggler, 'Israel summarily rejects Hamas offer of 10-year truce', Independent, 27 Jan. 2004, p. 13. See also Seumas Milne, 'Too late for two states', Guardian, 24 Jan. 2004.
79. Personal interviews with Ismail Abu Shanab (1998 and 2002), Usama Abu Hamdan (2002) and Khaled Mish'al (2002); see also Matthew Gutman, Nina Gilbert and Herb Keinon, 'Hamas official has a vision of living next to Israel', Jerusalem Post, 25 June 2003, p. 1; Chris McGreal, 'Sharon shies away from killing Hamas ideologue', Guardian, 13 June 2003, p. 19.
80. Personal interviews with Ismail Abu Shanab (1998 and 2002), Usama Abu Hamdan (2002) and Khaled Mish'al (2002); see also Matthew Gutman, Nina Gilbert and Herb Keinon, 'Hamas official has a vision of living next to Israel', Jerusalem Post, 25 June 2003, p. 1; Chris McGreal, 'Sharon shies away from killing Hamas ideologue', Guardian, 13 June 2003, p. 19.
81. Gutman et al., 'Hamas official has a vision of living next to Israel'. Abu Shanab had already expressed these sentiments to me in an interview in 1998, suggesting that he had been working on the Hamas leadership to accept a pragmatic solution even before the Al-Aqsa intifada.
82. See comments by a military commander quoted in McGreal, 'Sharon shies away from killing Hamas ideologue'.
83. See n. 62 above.
84. In the late 1980s, early 1990s and late 1990s.
85. Telephone interview, June 2003.
86. Poll no. 8, PCPSR, June 2003.
87. See Martin Woollacott, 'Sharon's target is not Arafat: Hamas must be drawn into a political role', Observer, 16 Oct. 2003, p. 14. Because Abbas lacked popular legitimacy, he was in a weaker position than Arafat and thus had more incentives to avoid alienating Hamas's constituency.
88. 'Hamas: diplomatic pressure vs. popularity', 18 June 2003, http://www.stratfor.biz (accessed 1 Oct. 2003).
89. Poll no. 9, PCPSR, 7-14 Oct. 2003.
90. See n. 62 above.
91. Poll no. 9, PCPSR, 7-14 Oct. 2003.
92. As Syria's sponsorship of Hamas is in part inspired by Israel's continuing occupation of the Golan Heights, any strategy of inducement or coercion directed towards Hamas must take this regional predicament into account.
93. Personal interviews, 1998; see also Menachem Klein, 'Competing brothers: the web of Hamas-PLO relations', Terrorism and Political Violence 8: 2, 1996, pp. 124-5, 132 (nn. 45-6).
94. Personal interviews, 1998; see also Menachem Klein, 'Competing brothers: the web of Hamas-PLO relations', Terrorism and Political Violence 8: 2, 1996, pp. 124-5, 132 (nn. 45-6).
95. 'Palestinian refugees and the negotiations for permanent status', Israel Palestine Centre for Research and Information, Aug. 2001, http://www.ipcri.org/ files/refugee-survey.html (accessed 2 Feb. 2004).
96. PSR Polls among Palestinian Refugees, PCPSR, 18 July 2003.
97. The MI6 emissary Alastair Crooke comes to the same conclusion. See Crooke and Milton-Edwards, 'Costly choice', p. 15.
98. It must be emphasized, however, that three of the most powerful voices in the external leadership - Khaled Mish'al, Musa Abu Marzuk and Usama Abu Hamdan - are all pragmatists.
99. This observation is supported by transition theory. See n. 53 above.
100. Shamir and Shikaki, 'Determinants of reconciliation and compromise among Israelis and Palestinians', pp. 197, 199.
101. Poll no. 8, PCPSR, June 2003. See also the survey results published in Shamir and Shikaki, 'Determinants of reconciliation and compromise among Israelis and Palestinians', p. 192.
102. Poll no. 8, PCPSR, June 2003. See also the survey results published in Shamir and Shikaki, 'Determinants of reconciliation and compromise among Israelis and Palestinians', p. 192.
103. Ibid., p. 199.
104. Darby, The effects of violence on peace processes, pp. 118-19. Darby qualifies the first statement by saying, 'as it is never possible to include all those who threaten the process, a principle of "sufficient inclusion" is necessary.'