Competition and regulation in air transport

A Handbook of Transport Economics

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 797-821

  Zhang, Anming ^a   Zhang, Yimin ^b   Clougherty, Joseph A ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b Europe International Business School   (China)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862136223     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4337/9780857930873.00045     Document Type: Chapter

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