Proportionality in counterinsurgency: A relational theory

Notre Dame Law Review

Volumn 87, Issue 3, 2012, Pages 1073-1111

  Criddle, Evan J ^a  

^a College of Law ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84862018280     PISSN: 07453515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (125)

1. S. C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4
2. U. N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
3. See S. C. Res. 1970, U. N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
4. Helene Cooper & David E. Sanger, Target in Libya Is Clear; Intent Is Not, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/21/ world/africa/21assess.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
5. For a general introduction to these debates, see the recently published collection of essays, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011).
6. See Theodore Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 244-45 (2000) (exploring the influence of human rights norms on IHL).
7. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 51 (5) (b), June 8, 1977, 1125 U. N. T. S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
8. See U. N Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, at 11, U. N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (prepared by Philip Alston) [hereinafter U. N. Report on Targeted Killing] ("Lethal force under human rights law is legal if it is strictly and directly necessary to save life.");
9. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION STUDY GROUP ON FRAGMENTATION § 2. 1, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/sessions/55/fragmentation- oudine.pdf (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
10. Cf. Monica Hakimi, State Bystander Responsibility, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 341 (2010) (developing a relational account of a state's responsibility to protect that emphasizes inter alia the relationship between the state and the third-party rights-abuser).
11. For an introduction to interpretive approaches to legal reasoning, see generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
12. S. C. Res. 1973, supra note 1, at pmbl.
13. HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY & HEADQUARTERS, MARINE CORPS COMBAT DEVELOPMENT COMMAND, FM3-24/MCWP 3-33.5
14. THE U. S. ARMY/MARINE CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL 383 (Univ. of Chi. Press, 2007) [hereinafter U. S. COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL]. This Article focuses on the use of force in counterinsurgency operations while recognizing at the same time that the use of force may be only one aspect of a broader counterinsurgency strategy.
15. See Michael N. Schmitt, Fault Lines in the Law of Attack, in TESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 277 (Susan C. Breau & Agniesszka Jachec-Neale eds., 2006).
16. See generally INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 5.
17. See Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U. S. T. 3316
18. 75 U. N. T. S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III];
19. Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U. N. T. S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
20. See LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 83 (3d ed. 2008) ("The definition of a non-international armed conflict in Protocol II... would exclude most revolutions and rebellions, and would probably not operate in a civil war until the rebels were well established and had set up some form of de facto government."). The United States is one of several states that have not ratified Additional Protocol II.
21. See, e.g., MICHAEL N. SCHMITT ET AL., THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY § 2.1.1.4 (2006)
22. reprinted in 36 ISR. Y. B. HUM. RTS. (Special Supplement) (2006).
23. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law Rules, at xxxv (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter ICRC Report], available at http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/ docs/vl (last visited Nov. 23, 2011).
24. William Abresch, A Human Rights Law of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 741, 748-49 (2005);
25. see also John B. Bellinger III & William J. Haynes II, A U. S. Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law (2007), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/ files/other/irrc-866-bellinger.pdf (raising objections to the ICRC's methodology);
26. Douglas J. Sylvester & Aaron X. Fellmeth, Targeting Decisions and Consequences for Civilians in the Columbian Civil Strife, in BEYOND WAR (Daniel Rothbart et al. eds., forthcoming 2011) (contesting the view that IHL proportionality applies as CIL to internal armed conflict).
27. 213 U. N. T. S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights];
28. McKerr v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2001), 1 110;
29. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 6, ¶ 3 HRI/GEN/l/Rev. 6(1982), ¶ 129.
30. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 129 (2d ed. 2010) ("Proportionality has nothing to do with injury to combatants or damage to military objectives.").
31. See David S. Roller, The Moral Imperative: Toward a Human Rights-Based Law of War, 46 HARV. INT'L L. J. 231, 260-61 (2005);
32. Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 32 (2004).
33. Isayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. Ct. H. R. 847, ¶ 175 (2005).
34. Cf. Marco Sassoli and Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-international Armed Conflicts, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 599, 613 (2008) (offering the example of an unarmed insurgent commander shopping in a grocery store outside an active zone of combat who could be targeted under IHL proportionality but only apprehended and arrested under HRL).
35. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 991, 1007 (2008) (reasoning that a civilian performing a "continuous combat function" for an organized armed group may be targeted under IHL even if they are not participating in hostilities at the precise moment an attack occurs).
36. See McCann and Others v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H. R. 97, ¶¶ 149-50 (1995).
37. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I. C. J. 226 (July 8).
38. Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm'n H. R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser. L./V/II. 9, doc. 6 rev. 1 271 (1998).
39. See CA. Res. 2675 (XXV), ¶ 1, U. N. Doc. A/RES/2675 (Dec. 9, 1970) ("Fundamental human rights, as accepted in international law and laid down in international instruments, continue to apply in situations of armed conflict.");
40. Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Concurrent Application of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law: A Victim Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 237, 249 (Roberta Arnold & Noelle Quenivet eds., 2008) (noting "extensive state practice to the effect that human rights law continues to apply during armed conflict").
41. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I. CJ. 136, 178 (July 9);
42. see also Case Concerning Armed Acdvities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I. CJ. 168, 242 ¶ 216 (Dec. 19, 2005) (considering the dual applicability of IHL and HRL).
43. See William A. Schabas, Lex Specialis ? Bell and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus ad Bellum, 40 ISR. L. REV. 592, 596-97, 611 (2007). Others have characterized the Court's invocation of IHL as a reaffirmation of the operational theory of lex specialis, arguing that IHL controls whenever armed conflict comes into play.
44. See Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 INT'L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 52 (2010);
45. W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC "Direct Participation in Hostilities" Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N. Y. U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 769 (2010).
46. See, e.g., Isayeva, Yusupova, and Bazayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. H. R. Rep. 39 (2005) [hereinafter Isayeva I];
47. Isayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. H. R. Rep. 38 (2005) [hereinafter Isayeva II];
48. Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Merits and Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 67 ¶ 33 (Feb. 4, 2000);
49. Kaya v. Turkey (no. 22535/93), 2000-III, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2000). Critics of this approach have argued that human rights tribunals lack competence in the law of armed conflict, as demonstrated by the fact that they apply HRL proportionality without acknowledging the resulting tensions with IHL.
50. Isayeva I, 41 Eur. H. R. Rep. 39, ¶ 13.
51. (citing, inter alia, McCann and Others v. United Kingdom (ser. A) No. 324, 21 Eur. H. R. Rep. 39, 45-46, 57 (1995).
52. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Aug. 4-5, 2003, Concluding Observations, 111, U. N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR. C0.78. ISR. En?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 23, 2011) ("[T]he applicability of the regime of international humanitarian law during an armed conflict does not preclude the application of the Covenant, including article 4 which covers situations of public emergency which threaten the life of the nation. ");
53. Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 15, 20 (2010) (arguing that HRL standards should "have an impact" on the use of force in noninternational armed conflict, and that some elements of IHL "may... requir[e] a profound overhaul" to satisfy HRL).
54. Some experts have argued that HRL should function as a gap filler for IHL in contexts where IHL as lex specialis "does not regulate the resort to lethal force with sufficient precision. " NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 176 (2008). For a survey of several additional possible paradigms for reconciling IHL and HRL
55. see Marco Sassdli, The Role of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in New Types of Armed Conflicts, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 34, 69-78 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011).
56. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 331 (2009);
57. Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Nature of State Legal Authority, 31 QUEEN'S LJ. 259 (2005);
58. Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights, 15 LEGAL THEORY 301 (2009);
59. Helen Stacy, Relational Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2029 (2003).
60. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mita Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, Conference on Trade and Development, Apr. 2010, U. N. Doc. No. 198 (sovereign debt);
61. Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117 (2006) (administrative law);
62. Ethan J. Leib & David L. Ponet, Fiduciary Representation and Children's Political Rights, 12 J. POL. PHIL, (forthcoming 2011) (children's political rights);
63. David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law's Lessons for Deliberative Democracy, 91 B. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (deliberative democracy);
64. Malcolm Thorburn, Justifications, Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE LJ. 1078 (2008) (criminal law);
65. Mary Wood, Atmospheric Trust and Fiduciary Duty, in FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC COMMONS (Ken Coghill ed., 2010) (environmental law).
66. See Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and O of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 513 (2009);
67. W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 866 (1990).
68. See Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL LJ. (forthcoming 2011).
69. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y v. Hyman, [2000] 2 All E. R. 331 (C. A.)
70. aff'd, [2002] 1 A. C. 408 (H. L.) (U. K.).
71. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDINC FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39-42 (James W. Ellington trans., 1981).
72. IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 64 (Mary Gregor trans., 1997).
73. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM (2009) (providing a general introduction to Kant's theory of legal order).
74. See, e.g., G. A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 138-40, U. N. Doc. A/RES/60/1, at 30 (Sept. 16, 2005);
75. INT'L COMM'N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Dec. 2001), http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf [hereinafter ICISS].
76. See LIBYA UNREST: SCORES KILLED IN BENGHAZI "MASSACRE", BBC NEWS, Feb. 20, 2011, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa- 12517327 (last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (describing funeral marches attacked with machine-gun and heavy weapons fire).
77. FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 107 (3d ed. 2005) (arguing that governments that violate human rights "breach a fiduciary duty").
78. see Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, Human Rights, Emergencies, and the Rule of Law, 34 HUM. RTS. Q. 39 (2012).
79. RENE PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 284 (2002).
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. K, § 702 cmts. d-i (1987).
81. See American Convention on Human Rights: "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica", Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U. N. T. S. 123;
82. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 4, 6, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U. N. T. S. 171;
83. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U. N. T. S. 221.
84. see also GA Res. 3314, U. N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, UN Doc. A/9631, at 142 (Dec. 14, 1974) (defining "aggression" for purposes of international intervention).
85. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U. N. T. S. 287.
86. Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U. N. T. S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I];
87. Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U. N. T. S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II].
88. See INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WEAPONS THAT MAY CAUSE SUFFERING OR HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS 13(1973), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/ Military-Law/pdf/RC-Weapons.pdf (arguing that "if a combatant can be put out of action by taking him prisoner, he should not be injured; if he can be put out of action by injury, he should not be killed; and if he can be put out of action by light injury, grave injury should be avoided");
89. Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 115, 115 (2010) (arguing that IHL should adopt "a least-harmful-means test, under which an alternative of capture or disabling of the enemy would be preferred to killing whenever feasible"). Whether the fiduciary theory has implications for what constitutes a legitimate "military advantage" is likewise a question I leave for another day.
90. Cf. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 111-17 (1977) (arguing that states ought not to insist upon "unconditional surrender" where this would lead to disproportionate military casualties).
91. See Juliet Chevalier-Watts, Has Human Rights Law Become Lex Specialis for the European Court of Human Rights for Right to Life Cases Arising From Internal Armed Conflicts?, 14 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 584 (2010).
92. Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISR. L. REV. 310, 332 (2007);
93. Dan E. Stigall et al., Human Rights and Military Decisions: Counterinsurgency and Trends in the Law of International Armed Conflict, 30 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1367 (2009).
94. See BVerfG, Feb. 15, 2006, docket number 1 BvR 357/05 (Ger.), available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20060215-lbvr035705 en. html (holding that the German Defense Minister could not shoot down a hijacked aircraft containing innocent passengers and crew members in order to protect other civilians from a 9/11-style attack).
95. Under the relational theory, a state's obligation to respect human rights extraterritorially would be triggered by its assertion of continuing public powers over persons beyond its borders. Compare General Comment No. 31 [80], Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. l/Add.13, ¶ 10 (2004)
96. Pad v. Turkey, App. No. 60167/00, Eur. Ct. H. R. (2007), available at http://cmiskp. echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentld= 821307&portal=hbktn&source=externalbydocnumber&table= F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C116 6DEA398649 (extraterritorial military action gave rise to obligations under Geneva Convention)
97. and Coard v. Unites States, Case 10. 951, Inter-Am. Comm'n H. R., Report No. 109/99, ¶ 37(1999), available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99 eng/Merits/UnitedStatesl0.951.htm (U. S. continued control over person extraterritorially gave rise to obligations under Geneva Conventions)
98. with Bankovic v. Belgium, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H. R. 335, 355-56 (2001) (finding no jurisdictional link between victims of NATO bombing in Yugoslavia and respondent states).
99. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 35 (2009);
100. see Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I. C. J. 136 (July 9);
101. See James G. Stewart, The UN Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon: A Legal Appraisal, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1039, 1042-43 (2007) (reviewing and critiquing the Report of the U. N. Human Rights Council's Commission of Inquiry on Lebanon and arguing that IHL would apply to the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict despite uncertainty regarding the legal status of Hezbollah militants).
102. Under the relational theory of lex specialis, IHL's proportionality standard would apply to the killing of Osama bin Laden, irrespective of whether the United States' struggle with Al Qaeda qualifies as (1) an "armed conflict" triggering IHL or (2) a nonarmed conflict governed by the customary international law of self defense. Compare Harold Hongju Koh, The Lawfulness of the U. S. Operation Against Osama bin Laden, OPINIO JURIS, (May 19, 2011, 6:00 AM) http://opiniojuris.org/2011/05/19/the-lawfulness-of-the-us- operation-against-osama-bin-laden (suggesting that the United States' conflict with Al Qaeda is an "armed conflict" under IHL)
103. with Marko Milanovic, When to Kill and When to Capture?, EJIL: TALK! (May 6, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/when-to-kill-and-when-to-capture (asserting that IHL does not impose a necessity requirement but suggesting that the attack against Osama bin Laden's compound did not take place within a context of armed conflict).
104. See, e.g., Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y. B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3 (2010). For present purposes, it will suffice to observe that under the relational approach adumbrated in this Article, HRL's more stringent proportionality standard would apply only where a state has asserted the type of continuing public powers that trigger the fiduciary principle; elsewhere, IHL norms or customary norms of self-defense would supply the governing standards.
105. Martti Koskenniemi outlines a general argument for Kantian interpretivism in international law in Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflection on Kantian Themes About International Law and Globalization, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRY L. 9 (2006). Although the relational theory supports applying HRL proportionality to internal armed conflict and belligerent occupation, it does not necessarily follow that all HRL norms should apply as lex specialis in these contexts. When IHL and HRL come into tension, states should apply the norm that most closely tracks their relational duties toward persons subject to their coercive powers. Some norms of IHL, -including, perhaps, customary standards for humane detainee treatment-might offer the best fit for states' relational obligations in internal armed conflict and belligerent occupation. For present purposes, however, I seek only to show that with respect to the current debate over proportionality in counter-insurgency operations, the relational theory supplies a strong normative argument for HRL's stricter standard.
106. Targeted Killings, HCJ 769/02, ¶ 60.
107. see also Palestinian Wall, 2004 I. C. J, at 180 (holding that the ICCPR "is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of jurisdiction outside its own territory").
108. Targeted Killings, HCJ 769/02, ¶ 4 (separate opinion of Vice President Rivlin)
109. (citing Eyal Benvenisti, Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare Enemy Civilians, 39 ISR. L. REV. 81, 88 (2006)).
110. See Targeted Killings, HCJ 769/02, ¶ 44 (disclaiming any intent to articulate "a comprehensive doctrine of proportionality").
111. cf. Palestinian Wall, 2004 I. C. J, at 178 (recognizing Israel as an occupying power in the West Bank). This conclusion is not universally accepted.
112. See Nicholas Rostow, Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon: Three Occupations under International Law, 37 ISR. Y. B. HUM. RTS. 205, 217-19 (2007).
113. The Court has emphasized on other occasions Israel's responsibility to consider and protect the human rights of individuals in the West Bank and Gaza alongside its obligations toward its own citizens. See HCJ 7957/04 Mara'abe v. Prime Minister of Israel [2005] IsrSC 38 (2) 393, ¶¶ 24, 29;
114. Martti Koskenniemi, Occupied Zone-A Zone of Reasonableness, 41 ISR. L. REV. 13, 17-18 (2008) (suggesting that the Court on various occasions has characterized the military as a "trustee of the Arab population").
115. Palestinian Wall, 2004 I. C. J. at 181.
116. Isayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur. Ct. H. R. 847, ¶ 175 (2005).
117. See Isayeva et al. v. Russia, App. Nos. 57947/00, 57948/00, 57949/00, 41 Eur. H. R. Rep. 39, ¶ 160(2005), available at http://www.humanrights. is/the-human-rights-project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/cases/regionalcases/ europeancourtofhumanrights/nr/2615.
118. See, e.g., THE U. K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 387, ¶ 11.8 (2004) ("The law of armed conflict applies... until [an] occupation terminates.");
119. See David Kilcullen, Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-level Counterinsurgency, 1 SMALL WARS J. 1, 5 (2006) ("Actions-even killing high-profile targets-that undermine trust... help the enemy.");
120. Peter R. Mansoor & Mark S. Ulrich, Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis, MILITARY REV., Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 46 ("Power emanates from the people; without their support neither the insurgent nor the counterinsurgent can win. ").
121. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT-CHIEFS OF STAFF, COUNTERINSURCENCY OPERATIONS, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-24, XVI (2009).
122. See Michael N. Schmitt, Targeting and International Humanitarian Law in Afghanistan, 39 ISR. Y. B. HUM. RTS. 307, 315-20 (2009) (discussing the "likely and identifiable threat" standard).
123. Press Release, Int'l Security Assistance Force H. Q. Pub. Affairs, Gen. Petraeus Issues Updated Tactical Directive, Emphasizes "Disciplined Use of Force" (Aug. 1, 2010) available at http://www.dvidshub.net/news/53931/gen- petraeus-issuesupdated-tactical-directive-emphasizes-disciplined-use-force (providing excerpts from the classified tactical directive).
124. See U. S. COUNTERINSURGENCY MANUAL, supra note 14, at 48-49.
125. See David W. Barno, Fighting "The Other War": Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003-2005, MILITARY REV., Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 90 (describing the "tolerance of the Afghan people for [counterinsurgency] as a 'bag of capital', one that was finite and had to be spent slowly and frugally" and suggesting that "Afghan civilian casualties... would have the effect of spending... this bag of capital... more quickly").