Neural sufficiency, reductionism, and cognitive neuropsychiatry

Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology

Volumn 18, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 339-344

  Sprevak, Mark ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cognitive neuropsychiatry; Extended mind; fMRI; Reductionism; Situated cognition

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861863736     PISSN: 10716076     EISSN: 10863303     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/ppp.2011.0057     Document Type: Article

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