The explanatory component of moral responsibility

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Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 326-354

  Björnsson, Gunnar ^a   Persson, Karl ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861603751     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: 14680068     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00813.x     Document Type: Review

References (28)

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3. Björnsson, G. (forthcoming) 'Joint Responsibility without Individual Control: Applying the Explanation Hypothesis,' Compatibilist Responsibility: Beyond Free Will and Determinism, eds. Jeroen van den Hoven, Ibo van de Poel and Nicole Vincent.
4. Björnsson, G. (manuscript) 'The Illusion of Undermined Responsibility.'.
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