Agent causation and the problem of luck

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 86, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 408-421

  Clarke, Randolph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 36749092732     PISSN: 02790750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00234.x     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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13. Mele, A. R. (2005). "Libertarianism, Luck, and Control," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86, pp. 381-407.
14. O'Connor, Timothy (1996). "Why Agent Causation?" Philosophical Topics 24, 2, pp. 143-58.
15. O'Connor, T. (2000). Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.
16. Pereboom, Derk (2001). Living without Free Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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18. van Inwagen, Peter (1983). An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon.
19. van Inwagen. P. (2000). "Free Will Remains a Mystery," Philosophical Perspectives 14, pp. 1-19.
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