Can DREs provide long-lasting security? The case of return-oriented programming and the AVC advantage

EVT/WOTE 2009 - 2009 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages

  Checkoway, Stephen ^a   Feldman, Ariel J ^b   Kantor, Brian ^a   Alex Halderman, J ^c   Felten, Edward W ^b   Shacham, Hovav ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b U Michigan ^*  (United States)

^c Dept of i and O e   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CODES (SYMBOLS); ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT EXCHANGE; MACHINE DESIGN; RANDOM ACCESS STORAGE; VOTING MACHINES;

EXPLOITATION TECHNIQUES; LONG LASTING; MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR; RETURN-ORIENTED PROGRAMMING; SECURITY FEATURES; SERVICE LIFETIME; SOURCE CODES; SYSTEMS SECURITY;

ELECTRONIC VOTING;

EID: 84861443711     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (28)

1. Alfred V. Aho, Ravi Sethi, and Jeffrey D. Ullman. Compilers: Principles, Techniques, and Tools. Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc., Boston, MA, USA, 1986.
2. Andrew W. Appel. How I bought used voting machines on the Internet, February 2007. http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/avc/.
3. Andrew W. Appel, Maia Ginsburg, Harri Hursti, Brian W. Kernighan, Christopher D. Richards, and Gang Tan. Insecurities and inaccuracies of the Sequoia AVC Advantage 9.00H DRE voting machine, October 2008. Online: http://citp.princeton.edu/voting/advantage/ advantage-insecurities-redacted.pdf.
4. Andrew W. Appel, Maia Ginsburg, Harri Hursti, Brian W. Kernighan, Christopher D. Richards, Gang Tan, and Penny Venetis. The New Jersey voting-machine lawsuit and the AVC Advantage DRE voting machine. In David Jefferson, Joseph Lorenzo Hall, and Tal Moran, editors, Proceedings of EVT/WOTE 2009. USENIX/ACCURATE/IAVoSS, August 2009.
5. Yonatan Aumann, Yan Zong Ding, and Michael Rabin. Everlasting security in the bounded storage model. IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, 48(6):1668-80, June 2002.
6. California Secretary of State Debra Bowen. “Top-to-Bottom” Review of voting machines certified for use in California. Technical report, California Secretary of State, 2007. http://sos.ca.gov/elections/elections.vsr.htm.
7. Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner. Evaluation & Validation of Election-Related Equipment, Standards & Testing. Technical report, Ohio Secretary of State, 2007. http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/Text.aspx?page=4512.
8. Erik Buchanan, Ryan Roemer, Hovav Shacham, and Stefan Savage. When good instructions go bad: Generalizing return-oriented programming to RISC. In Paul Syverson and Somesh Jha, editors, Proceedings of CCS 2008, pages 27-38. ACM Press, October 2008.
9. Compuware Corporation. Direct recording electronic (DRE) technical security assessment report, November 2003.
10. Seda Davtyan, Sotiris Kentros, Aggelos Kiayias, Laurent Michel, Nicolas Nicolaou, Alexander Russell, Andrew See, Narasimha Shashidhar, and Alexander A. Shvartsman. Pre-election testing and post-election audit of optical scan voting terminal memory cards. In David Dill and Tadayoshi Kohno, editors, Proceedings of EVT 2008. USENIX/ACCURATE, July 2008.
11. Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten. Security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine. In Ray Martinez and David Wagner, editors, Proceedings of EVT 2007. USENIX/ACCURATE, August 2007. http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/ts-paper.pdf.
12. Edward W. Felten. NJ election day: Voting machine status, June 2008. http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/ nj-election-day-voting-machine-status.
13. Aurélien Francillon and Claude Castelluccia. Code injection attacks on Harvard-architecture devices. In Paul Syverson and Somesh Jha, editors, Proceedings of CCS 2008, pages 15-26. ACM Press, October 2008.
14. J. Alex Halderman and Ariel J. Feldman. AVC Advantage: Hardware functional specifications. Technical Report TR-816-08, Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, March 2008.
15. Joshua S. Herbach. Simulating the Sequoia AVC Advantage DRE voting machine, May 2007. http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~herbach/SimulatingAVCAdvantage.pdf.
16. Ralf Hund, Thorsten Holz, and Felix Freiling. Return-oriented rootkits: Bypassing kernel code integrity protection mechanisms. In Fabian Monrose, editor, Proceedings of Usenix Security 2009. USENIX, August 2009. To appear.
17. Harri Hursti. Critical security issues with Diebold TSx, May 2006.
18. Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin, and Dan S. Wallach. Analysis of an electronic voting system. In David A. Wagner and Michael Waidner, editors, Proceedings of Security and Privacy (“Oakland”) 2004, pages 27-40. IEEE Computer Society, May 2004.
19. Sebastian Krahmer. x86-64 buffer overflow exploits and the borrowed code chunks exploitation technique, September 2005. http://www.suse.de/~krahmer/no-nx.pdf.
20. Tal Moran and Moni Naor. Receipt-free universally-verifiable voting with everlasting privacy. In Cynthia Dwork, editor, Proceedings of Crypto 2006, volume 4117 of LNCS, pages 373-92. Springer-Verlag, September 2006.
21. RABA Innovative Solution Cell. Trusted agent report: Diebold AccuVote-TS voting system, January 2004.
22. Science Applications International Corporation. Risk assessment report Diebold AccuVote-TS voting system and processes, September 2003.
23. Sequoia Voting Systems. AVC Advantage. http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/downloads/AVCAdvantage.pdf.
24. Hovav Shacham. The geometry of innocent flesh on the bone: Return-into-libc without function calls (on the x86). In Sabrina De Capitani di Vimercati and Paul Syverson, editors, Proceedings of CCS 2007, pages 552-61. ACM Press, October 2007.
25. Sequoia Voting Systems. Response from Sequoia Voting Systems to the California Secretary of State's office on the Top-to-Bottom Review of Voting Systems, July 2007. http://www.sequoiavote.com/press.php?ID=32.
26. Sequoia Voting Systems. Response from Sequoia Voting Systems to the expert report of Andrew W. Appel evaluating the security and accuracy of the Sequoia AVC Advantage DRE voting computer, October 2008. http://www.sequoiavote.com/documents/SVS_Response_to_Appel_report_NJ.pdf.
27. David Wagner, David Jefferson, and Matt Bishop. Security analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic interpreter, February 2006.
28. ZiLOG Inc., San Jose, CA, USA. Z80 Family CPU User Manual, 2004.