Security analysis of the diebold accuvote-TS voting machine

EVT 2007 - 2007 USENIX/ACCURATE Electronic Voting Technology Workshop

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages

  Feldman, Ariel J ^a   Alex Halderman, J ^a   Felten, Edward W ^a,b  

^a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CODES (SYMBOLS); MALWARE; TURING MACHINES; VIRUSES; VOTING MACHINES;

DIEBOLD; HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE; MACHINE TO MACHINES; MALICIOUS CODES; MEMORY CARD; SECURITY ANALYSIS; SECURITY STUDIES;

ELECTRONIC VOTING;

EID: 85078509877     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

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