Strategic formation of credit networks

WWW'12 - Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference on World Wide Web

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 559-568

  Dandekar, Pranav ^a   Goel, Ashish ^a   Wellman, Michael P ^b   Wiedenbeck, Bryce ^b  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Credit networks; Empirical gametheoretic analysis; Strategic network formation; Trust

Indexed keywords

BEST RESPONSE; CHAIN OF TRUST; CREDIT NETWORKS; EXCHANGE ECONOMIES; GAME ANALYSIS; GAME-THEORETIC; HEURISTIC STRATEGY; HIGH RATE; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NETWORK FORMATION; POTENTIAL GAMES; PRICE OF ANARCHY; SOCIAL DISTANCE; SOCIAL NETWORKS; SOCIAL OPTIMUMS; STAR STRUCTURE; STAR-LIKE; TRUST;

STARS; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

WORLD WIDE WEB;

EID: 84860843931     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2187836.2187912     Document Type: Conference Paper

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