Crime, immigration, and ad hoc instrumentalism

New Criminal Law Review

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 157-223

  Sklansky, David Alan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84860805146     PISSN: 19334192     EISSN: 19334206     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/nclr.2012.15.2.157     Document Type: Review

References (230)

1. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1890 (2000).
2. See Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, FY 2009 Federal Prosecutions Sharply Higher: Surge Driven by Steep Jump in Immigration Filings (2009), trac.syr.edu;
3. Joanna Lydgate, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity & Diversity, Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline (2009).
4. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 469 (2007);
5. Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 Geo. Immigr. LJ. 611 (2003).
6. See William J. Sabol, Heather C. West, & Matthew Cooper, U. S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 2008 (2009);
7. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, Huge Increase in Transfers of ICE Detainees (2009), trac.syr.edu.
8. See, e.g., Juliet P. Stumpf States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N. C. L. Rev. 1557 (2008).
9. E.g., Jennifer Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 135 (2009);
10. Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 367 (2006).
11. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
12. Jennifer Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 Duke L. J. 1563 (2010);
13. Jennifer Chacón, Whose Community Shield?: Examining the Removal of the "Criminal Street Gang Member", 2007 U. Chi. Legal F. 317;
14. Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September nth "Pale of Law", 29 N. C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 639 (2004);
15. Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control After September nth, B. C. Third World LJ. 81 (2005);
16. see Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1281 (2010);
17. Allegra M. McLeod, The U. S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
18. David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in a Contemporary Society (2001);
19. Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (2007).
20. Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises 141 (1926) (paperback ed. 2006).
21. See Act of Mar. 4, 1929, Pub. L. No. 70-1018, 45 Stat. 1551;
22. Mae M. Ngai, The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921-1965, 21 Law & Hist. Rev. 69, 76 (2003). Counterfeiting immigration documents, or obtaining them by fraud, had been made a felony five years earlier.
23. See Immigration Act of 1924, Pub. L. 68-139, § 22, 43 Stat. 153, 165;
24. superseded by Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 1542, 65 Stat. 683, 771;
25. codified as amended at 18 U. S. C. § 1542.
26. The Passport Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-154, ch. 81, 40 Stat. 559, authorized a twenty-year sentence for entering the United States without a passport, but when the government tried to use this statute to prosecute immigration violations in peacetime, the Eighth Circuit called a halt to the practice. The court explained: "It has never been the policy of this Government to punish criminally aliens who come here in contravention of our immigration laws. Deportation has been the remedy."
27. Flora v. Rustad, 8 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1925);
28. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 414, tit. II, ch. 8, § 276, 66 Stat. 163, 229
29. (codified as amended at 8 U. S. C. 1326 (1996));
30. see Doug Keller, Why the Prior Conviction Sentencing Enhancements in Illegal Re-entry Cases are Unjust and Unjustified (and Unreasonable Too), 51 B. C. L. Rev. 719, 729 (2010).
31. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 103 (a), 100 Stat. 3359, 3380;
32. codified as amended at 18 U. S. C. § 1546 (b).
33. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, § 2 (d), 100 Stat. 3537;
34. codified as amended at 8 U. S. C. 1325 (c).
35. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. VII, §§ 7345 & 7346, 102 Stat. 4181, 4471;
36. codified as amended at 8 U. S. C. §§ 1326 (b) & 1327.
37. Id. at § 7345, 8 U. S. C. § 1326 (2006);
38. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, tit, V, §§ 122, 543 (b), 104 Stat. 4978, 4994, 5059;
39. codified as amended at 8 U. S. C. § 1325-1327.
40. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. XIII, § 130001 (b), 108 Stat. 1796, 2023;
41. codified as amended at 8 U. S. C. § 1326.
42. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-557, div. C, tit. I, § 108 (b) (1), tit. II, §§ 213, 214;
43. codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1324c (e)
44. 18 U. S. C. §§ 758, 1546 (a).
45. see also Russell Goldman, What's Clogging the Courts? Ask America's Busiest Judge, ABC News, July 23, 2008, abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id= 5420227&page=i.
46. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (b) (1) & (2);
47. United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2009).
48. Table 5 data are from statistics compiled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and published in its annual report, Judicial Business of the U. S. Courts, www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness.aspx. Through 1999, the number of petty immigration dispositions is reported in Table M-iA; from 2000 on, it appears in Table M-2. All figures are for the year ending September 30.
49. Spencer S. Hsu, Immigration Prosecutions Hit New High, Wash. Post, June 2, 2008, at A1.
50. The mean sentence for defendants sentenced under § 2L1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines for the 2009 fiscal year was 21.2 months. See United States Sentencing Commission, Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, tbl. 50(2009), www.ussc.gov/Data-and-Statistics/Annual-Reports-and- Sourcebooks/2009/Table50.pdf.
51. Section 2L1.2 of the guidelines applies not only to convictions obtained under 8 U. S. C. § 1326
52. the illegal reentry statute, but also to nonpetty convictions under 8 U. S. C. § 1325-i.e., to convictions under § 1325 for a second or subsequent offense.
53. See United States Sentencing Commission, Federal Sentencing Guideline Manual § 2L2.1 comm. (2009), www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2009-guidelines/ Manual/GL2009.pdf;
54. id. app. C, amend. 38, www.ussc.gov/Guidelines/2009-guidelines/Manual/ APPCVOLI.pdf. A case of the latter sort also will be chargeable, and probably will be charged, under § 1326, although it may ultimately be pleaded down to a violation of § 1325.
55. The data in Table 6 are drawn from the Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics, published annually by the United States Sentencing Commission since 1996 and available at www.ussc.gov/Data-and-Statistics/archives.cfm. The numbers are for years ending September 30. They are found in Table 45 of the 1996 volume and in Table 50 of the subsequent volumes. These tables also show the average sentence in illegal entry cases for each year; that number rises from 28.9 months in 1996 to 36 months in 2000 and then falls steadily to 21.2 months in 2009.
56. For Table 7 data, see Office of Immigration Statistics, U. S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, tbl. 33 (2010) [hereinafter 2009 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics], www.dhs.gov/files/ statistics/publications/yearbook. shtm. The data are reported for the year ending September 30.
57. Table 8 is constructed from the data in Tables 4 and 7. For each year, the total number of cases charged under 8 U. S. C. §§ 1325 and 1326 is divided by the number of apprehensions. The numbers in Table 8 for years through 2007, and particularly for the period from to 2004 to 2007, are probably too low, and the jump in 2008 is probably not quite as steep as Table 8 suggests, because local federal prosecutors apparently underreported petty immigration prosecutions through 2007.
58. See Joanna Lydgate, Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity & Diversity, An Alternative to Operation Streamline: Border Enforcement in the Southern District of California (2010).
59. See Dylan Smith, McCain, Kyl Announce Border Security Plans, Tucson Sentinel, Apr. 19, 2010, www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/041910-mccain-kyl- border.
60. Jon Kyl & John McCain, Gov't is Failing Border Residents, Florence (Ariz.) Reminder & Blade-Tribune, July 8, 2010, trivalleycentral.com/ articles/2010/07/08/florence-reminder-blade-tribune/top-stories/doc4c3 5019888d22220419477.txt.
61. United States ex rel. Klonis v. Davis, 13 F.2d 630 (1926).
62. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 Conn. Pub. Int. LJ. 243, 252-56 (2010).
63. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
64. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2580-81 (2010);
65. Lea McDermid, Comment, Deportation is Different: Noncitizens and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 741, 756-62 (2001). (Pubitemid 33629869)
66. 8 U. S. C. § 1101 (a) (43). But not a misdemeanor conviction for a small amount of marijuana that could have been, but was not, charged as a felony because the defendant had a prior conviction.
67. See Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2589-90.
68. 8 U. S. C. §§ 1182 (a) (9) (A) (ii) - (iii), 1226 (c) (1);
69. 8 U. S. C. § 1229a (3);
70. see, e.g., Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?, supra note 8, at 1565 n. 2. Historically, deportations outnumbered exclusions by roughly 10:1. Compare, e.g., Office of Immigration Statistics, U. S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, tbl. 44 (2005) [hereinafter 2004 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics], www.dhs.gov/files/statistics/ publications/yearbook.shtm, with id. tbl. 46. total aliens removed."
71. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Setting the Record Straight 4, 6 (2010) [hereinafter Setting the Record Straight].
72. ICE is part of the Department of Homeland Security. When it created the DHS in 2002, Congress transferred and divided up responsibilities previously exercised by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), within the Department of Justice. Most immigration enforcement responsibilities were given to ICE, but border administration was placed in Customs and Border Protection, another division of DHS. (Still another component of DHS, Citizenship and Immigration Services, took over many of the administrative functions previously performed by INS, including the granting of asylum, employment authorization, permanent resident status, and citizenship.) See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). ICE is not merely a relocated branch of INS, though; it is a relocated and vastly expanded branch of INS. "Prior to September 11, 2001, the INS had fewer than two thousand agents to enforce immigration laws in the interior of the United States.... In 2010, ICE will have 20, 000 employees."
73. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?, supra note 8, at 1572.
74. See Chacón, Whose Community Shield?, supra note 8, at 327-32, 345-48;
75. Kirk Semple, Gang Activity Now a Focus for Immigration Agents, N. Y. Times, Dec. 10, 2010, at A23. ICE claims that Operation Community Shield has resulted in "over 6, 000 criminal arrests and nearly 9, 000 administrative immigration arrests", and that "nearly 6, 000 of the arrested suspects had violent criminal histories."
76. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, United States Department of Homeland Security, Targeting Violent Transnational Street Gangs, www.ice.gov/community- shield/. Not all of the gang members or gang associates targeted under Operation Community Shield are identified by local police agencies; some of the arrests under the program have resulted from operations carried out unilaterally by ICE.
77. National Institute of Justice, U. S. Department of Justice, Reducing Gun Violence: The Boston Gun Project's Operation Ceasefire 2 (2001). On using the "lever" of deportation, see, e.g., David M. Kennedy, Anthony A. Braga, & Anne M. Piehl, Designing and Implementing Operation Ceasefire, in id. at 5, 34.
78. Nora Demleitner, Immigration Threats and Rewards: Effective Law Enforcement Tools in the "War" on Terrorism, 51 Emory L. J. 1059, 1078-82 (2002). Negotiated dispositions without cooperation agreements have long been a staple of immigration proceedings, much as they are in criminal cases. The immigration equivalent to the negotiated guilty plea has been the "voluntary departure", negotiated as an informal alternative to a judicial order of removal.
79. The numbers in Table 11 come from Alison Siskin, Congressional Research Service, Immigration-Related Detention: Current Legislative Issues 12 (2004) for the years 1994-2002, www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32369.pdf;
80. Alison Siskin, Congressional Reseach Service, Health Care for Noncitizens in Immigration Detention 26 (2008) for the years 2003-2006, www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/18888.pdf;
81. and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Average Daily Population (ADP) for Fiscal Year 2009 (spreadsheet prepared pursuant to FOIA request, Oct. 2009) for the years 2007-2009. The reports from the Congressional Research Service rely on data published by the INS and the DHS.
82. Dora Schriro, U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration Detention Overview and Recommendations 6(2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/ offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf
83. See Mark Dow, American Gulag: Inside U. S. Immigration Prisons 97 (2004).
84. See, e.g., Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, no Colum. L. Rev. Sidebar 42, 57 & n. 101 (2010);
85. Meredith Kolodner, Immigration Enforcement to Benefit Detention Companies, N. Y. Times, Jul. 19, 2006, at C1;
86. Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. Immigration Law, NPR News Investigations, Oct. 28, 2010, www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyId=13o833741.
87. See Donald Kerwin & Serena Yi-Yang Lin, Migration Policy Inst., Immigrant Detention: Can ICE Meet Its Legal Imperatives and Case Management Responsibilities? 17-18 (2009);
88. See Sarah Phelan, Who Profits from ICE's Electronic Monitoring Anklets?, S. F. Bay Guardian Online, Mar. 16, 2010, www.bestofthebay.com/politics/2010/03/ 16/whoprofits-ices-electronic-monitoring-anklets-o.
89. See 8 U. S. C. § 1226 (c) (1).
90. See, e.g., Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 Geo. L. J. 1135, 1136-37, 1146-47, 1167-68 (2004).
91. Setting the Record Straight, supra note 62, at 4, 6.
92. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U. S. Department of Homeland Security, ICE Announces Launch of Online Detainee Locator System (Jul. 23, 2010), www.ice.gov/news/releases/1007/100723washingtondc.htm.
93. See Debra A. Hoffmaster et al., Police Executive Research Forum, Police and Immigration: How Chiefs Are Leading Their Communities Through the Challenges (2011);
94. Hubert Williams, Foreword, in Anita Khashu, Police Foundation, The Role of Local Police: Striking a Balance Between Immigration Enforcement and Civil Liberties, viii (2009);
95. Julia Preston, Police Chiefs Wary of Immigration Role, N. Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2011, at A17.
96. See Chacón, Managing Migration, supra note 6;
97. Chacón, Whose Community Shield?, supra note 8;
98. Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1084, 1084-88 (2004).
99. Office of State & Local Cooperation, U. S. Department of Homeland Security, ACCESS-Agreements of Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security [hereinafter ACCESS], www.ice.gov/access/;
100. see also Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?, supra note 8, at 1582-95.
101. ACCESS, supra note 94.
102. Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009-546, -563 & -564
103. (codified as amended at 8 U. S. C. § 1357 (g));
104. see also, e.g., Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?, supra note 8, at 1582-86.
105. Khashu, The Role of Local Police, supra note 91, at 5.
106. Office of State & Local Cooperation, U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Delegation of Immigration Authority, Section 287 (g), Immigration and Naturalization Act (online factsheet), www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g. htm.
107. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Secure Communities: A Modernized Approach to Identifying and Removing Criminal Aliens (2010) [hereinafter Secure Communities], www.ice.gov/doclib/ secure-communities/pdf/sc-brochure.pdf. Secure Communities is operated jointly by the DHS and the Department of Justice.
108. See, e.g., Tess Townsend, "Secure Communities" Raises Questions, Bay Citizen, Aug. 18, 2010, www.baycitizen.org/immigration/story/ homeland-securityprogram-deporting-bay/ (quoting Curtis Hill, president of the California state Sheriffs' Association, praising Secure Communities for "utilizing] federal resources to get these folks back to prison").
109. Office of State & Local Cooperation, U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Secure Communities Fact Sheet (2009), http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/ secure-communities/securecommunitiespresentations.pdf
110. Office of State & Local Cooperation, U. S. Department of Homeland Security, Activated Jurisdictions, www.ice.gov/secure-communities/.
111. Secure Communities, supra note 99.
112. Compare, e.g., Napolitano Confirms Secure Communities Opt-Out Process, Deportation Nation, Sept. 17, 2010, www.deportationnation.org/2010/09/ napolitanoconfirms-secure-communities-opt-out-process
113. with Julia Preston, States Resisting Program Central to Obama's Immigration Strategy, N. Y. Times, May 6, 2011, at A18 (noting that DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano "has said that Secure Communities is mandatory"). There also has been confusion about whether a local agency can opt out except by refusing to share fingerprints with the federal criminal justice system-see Confusion Over Secure Communities, N. Y. Times, Oct. 5, 2010, at A26-and about whether a local agency can opt out over the objection of the state in which it is located.
114. See Kirk Semple, Program to Have Police Spot Illegal Immigrants Is Mired in Confusion, N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2010, at A23;
115. Gene Davis, Unsure on Secure Communities?, Denver Daily News, Sept. 7, 2010;
116. Samantha Bell, SF Sheriff Tries to Opt Out of Secure Communities Program, Again, SF Appeal, Sept. 1, 2010, sfappeal.com/news/2010/09/post-1.php;
117. Sarah Phelan, ICE Suggests SF Secure-Comm Opt-Out Possible, S. F. Bay Guardian, Sept. 1, 2010, www.sfbg.com/politics/2010/09/01/ice-suggests-sf- securecomm-opt-out-possible. It is also unclear whether localities can join the program without a state-level agreement.
118. See, e.g., Michael Levenson, Opponents Blast Patrick on Immigration, Boston Globe, Sept. 24, 2010, at 4;
119. Renée Feltz, Rapid Spread of Secure Communities May Ease Up, Deportation Nation, Sept. 14, 2010, www.deportationnation.org/2010/09/ rapidspread-of-secure-communities-may-ease-up/.
120. See Center for Constitutional Rights, National Day Laborers' Organizing Network & Kathryn O. Greenberg Immigration Justice Clinic, Briefing Guide to "Secure Communities", 2 n. 7 (2010) [hereinafter Briefing Guide to "Secure Communities"], http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/ Cardozo/Profiles/immigrationlaw-741/NDLON-FOIA-Briefing%20guide. final.pdf.
121. Secure Communities, supra note 99;
122. see also, e.g., Setting the Record Straight, supra note 62.
123. Briefing Guide to "Secure Communities", supra note 104, at 2 & n. 7.
124. United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010)
125. aff'd, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir.)
126. cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011). Other provisions of the Arizona law, also enjoined by the district court, make it a state crime for any noncitizen to seek work in Arizona or to fail to carry an alien registration document, and require the police to check the immigrations status of all arrested persons before they are released.
127. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 987. Regarding the involvement of the private prison industry in the drafting and passage of the Arizona law
128. See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, The Great American Crime Decline (2007);
129. Rubén G. Rumbaut, Appendix D, Undocumented Immigration and Rates of Crime and Imprisonment: Popular Myths and Empirical Realities, in Khashu, The Role of Local Police, supra note 91, at 119, 124-25 (2009);
130. Randal C. Archibold, In Border Violence, Perception is Greater Than Crime Statistics, N. Y. Times, June 20, 2010, at A18;
131. Charlie Savage, Crime Rates Fell in'09 Despite Economy, F. B. I. Says, N. Y. Times, May 25, 2010, at A15;
132. Barry Krisberg, Berkeley Center for Criminal Justice, Where Is the Fire? Immigrants and Crime in California (2010).
133. See Carolyn Moehling & Anne Morrison Piehl, Immigration, Crime, and Incarceration in Early Twentieth-Century America, 46 Demography 739 (2009).
134. See, e.g., Tim Padgett, The "Dangerous" Border: Actually One of America's Safest Places, Time, July 30, 2010, www.time.com/time/nation/article/ o, 8599, 2007474, 00.html;
135. Dennis Wagner, Violence Is Not Up on Arizona Border Despite Mexican Drug War, Ariz. Republic, May 2, 2010, www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/05/02/ 20100502arizona-border-violencemexico.html?source=nletter-news.
136. The data in Table 15 are taken from Migration Policy Institute, Foreign-Born Population and Foreign Born as Percentage of the Total US Population, 1850 to 2008, dataset available at www.migrationinformation.org/ datahub/charts/MPIDataHub-Number-Pct-FB-1850-2008.xls.
137. See also Brookings Institution, State of Metropolitan America: On the Front Lines of Demographic Transformation 65-67 (2010).
138. See, e.g., Douglas Husak, Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law (2008).
139. For an early argument along these lines-before September 11, 2001-see Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 669, 674-76 (1997).
140. See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 223 (2007). Even in the area of immigration, Ingrid Eagly argues that criminal prohibitions have been "fairly static over time", expanding far less than they could; she stresses that "our hybrid immigration system" remains "far broader on the civil side than on the criminal side."
141. Cf, e.g., Peter R. Moyers, Butchering Statutes: The Postville Raid and the Misinterpretation of Federal Criminal Law, 32 Seattle U. L. Rev. 651, 688 (2009) (discussing "the inverse of crimmigration, namely, the 'immigrationization' of criminal law... the use of the criminal justice system to effect goals of immigration law").
142. Stuart A. Scheingold, The Politics of Street Crime: Criminal Process and Cultural Obsession (1991).
143. For a thoughtful argument that governance increasingly relies on the criminal process because of the institutional and procedural advantages that, for historically contingent reasons, criminal enforcers have come to enjoy, see Daniel Richman, Overcriminalization for Lack of Better Options: A Celebration of Bill Stuntz, in The Political Heart of Criminal Justice: Essays on Themes of William J. Stuntz 64-86 (Michael Klarman, David Skeel, & Carol Steiker eds., 2012).
144. For accounts of crimmigration drawing explicitly on Simon's work, see Chacón, Managing Migration, supra note 6;
145. See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Proposition 187 and the Ghost of James Bradley Thayer, 17 Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 24 (1995).
146. See, e.g., Randal Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N. Y. Times, April 24, 2010, at A1.
147. Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968).
148. E.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 115 (2007).
149. E.g., William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L. J. 1 (1997).
150. See, e.g., Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: The Threat to the Rule of Law (2006).
151. See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, Democracy and the Police 44-48 (2008);
152. Tracey L. Meares, Terry and the Relevance of Politics, 72 St. John's L. Rev. 1343 (1998).
153. E.g., Jonathan Simon, Poor Discipline: Parole and the Social Control of the Underclass, 1890-1990, at 230-39 (1993).
154. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 Geo. L. J. 1153 (1998);
155. Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551 (1997).
156. See, e.g., Mary Price, Everything Old is New Again: Fixing Sentencing By Going Back to First Principles, 36 New Eng. J. Crim. & Civ. Confinement 75 (2010).
157. Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform: When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 Me. L. Rev. 569, 571 (2005);
158. but cf. Terance Miethe, Charging and Plea Bargaining Practices Under Determinate Sentencing: An Investigation of the Hydraulic Displacement of Discretion, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 155 (1987) (providing evidence that discretion did not inevitably relocate).
159. See, e.g., David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 Geo. L. J. 1059 (1999).
160. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Arbitary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor (2007);
161. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1969, 2039 & n. 327 (2008);
162. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor's Office, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 2089 (2010);
163. Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869 (2009).
164. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1332 (2008);
165. Carol Steiker, Tempering or Tampering? Mercy and the Administration of Criminal Justice, in Forgiveness, Mercy and Clemency (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007).
166. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 Yale L. J. 835 (1992).
167. "At year-end 2007, nearly 825, 000 adult men and women were under parole supervision in the United States, nearly four times the number on parole in 1980." Elizabeth C. McBride, Note, Policing Parole: The Constitutional Limits of Back-End Sentencing, 20 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 597, 601 (2009).
168. Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice, Spreadsheets, bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/content/dtdata.cfmorrections ("Prisoners sentenced to more than one year who were admitted to state or federal jurisdiction, 1977-98"; "New court commitments sentenced to more than one year who were admitted to state or federal jurisdiction, 1977-98";
169. and "Conditional release violators sentenced to more than one year, returned to state or federal jurisdiction, 1977-98");
170. Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice, Annual Probation Survey and Annual Parole Survey, bjs.ojp. usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty= dcdetail&iid=271 ("Adults on parole in the United States, 1975-2008");
171. and data on state and federal prison admissions from 1999 through 2007, provided in response to an email request.
172. Samson v. California, 547 U. S. 843, 853 (2006).
173. Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U. S. 357, 367 (1998).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 543 U. S. 112 (2001).
175. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 10-24 (1997). (Pubitemid 127430163)
176. F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom 54 (1994);
177. see also, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in The Authority of the Law 210, 210, 219 (1979);
178. cf Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989).
179. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 3, 5 (1940).
180. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 17 (1948) (Jackson, J.) (requiring police officers to have probable cause and a judicial warrant before searching a hotel room, because "any other rule... would obliterate one of the most fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law, and the police-state where they are the law").
181. Cf. Whren v. United States, 517 U. S. 806 (1996).
182. William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780 (2006);
183. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505 (2001);
184. William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale LJ. 2137 (2002);
185. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1795 (1998). (Pubitemid 128433176)
186. For other important work on the political economy of criminal justice, see Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 58 Duke LJ. 2087 (2009);
187. Daniel C. Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 Crime & Just. 377 (2006);
188. Daniel C. Richman, "Project Exile" and the Allocation of Federal Law Enforcement Authority, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 369 (2001).
189. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Passel & D'Vera Cohen, Pew Hispanic Center, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United States (2009).
190. At the national level alone, see, for example, the websites maintained by the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project (www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights);
191. the American Immigration Council (www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org);
192. Amnesty International USA's Refugee Program (www.amnestyusa.org/refugees- and-asylum/page.do?id=ionoio);
193. the Detention Watch Network (www.detentionwatchnetwork.org);
194. Familes for Freedom (www.familiesforfreedom.org);
195. the National Counsel of la Raza (www.nclr.org);
196. the Immigrant Defense Project (www.immigrantdefenseproject.org);
197. the Immigrant Legal Resource Center (www.ilrc.org);
198. the National Immigration Forum (www.immigrationforum.org);
199. the National Immigration Justice Center (www.immigrantjustice.org);
200. the National Lawyers Guild's National Immigration Project (www.nationalimmigrationproject.org);
201. the National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights (www.nnirr.org);
202. the National Immigrant Solidarity Network (www.immigrantsolidarity.org);
203. and the Rights Working Group (www.rightsworkinggroup.org).
204. See Susan Carroll, Columbian Healer Held as a Dealer in Houston Cell, Houston Chron., Nov. 6, 2010, at A1.
205. See Susan Carroll, Charges Dropped Against Columbian Medicine Man, Houston Chron., Nov. 16, 2010, at B2.
206. See Jessica Kwong, Steve Li, City College Student, Awaits Deportation, S. F. Chron., Nov. 2, 2010, at A3;
207. Jessica Kwong, Freed Student Steve Li Returns to S. F., S. F. Chron., Nov. 23, 2010, at A1.
208. See Bob Egelko, Deportations to Tear Apart S. F. Family, S. F. Chron., Mar. 2, 2010, at C1;
209. Bob Egelko, Boy Who Punched Schoolmate Won't Be Deported, S. F. Chron., Apr. 22, 2010, at C1;
210. Bob Egelko, Family Facing Deportation Breakup Wins Reprieve, S. F. Chron., Mar. 3, 2010, at A1 (quoting mayoral spokesman Tony Winnicker).
211. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202 (1982);
212. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971);
213. but cf. Matthew v. Diaz, 426 U. S. 67 (1976) (applying rational basis review to federal discrimination on the basis of citizenship).
214. Compare, e.g., Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 177, with
215. e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Gordon Hawkins, & Sam Kamin, Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You're Out in California (2001);
216. David Alan Sklansky, Killer Seatbelts and Criminal Procedure, 119 Harv. L. Rev. F. 56 (2006);
217. Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice: Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1709 (1993).
218. See, e.g., Kirk Semple, Governor Pardons Six Immigrants Facing Deportation Over Old Crimes, N. Y. Times, Dec. 6, 2010, at A25.
219. See, e.g., Russell Contreras, Activists Protest Patrick's Plan for Immigration Checks; tState Police Would Join U. S. Program, Boston Globe, Dec. 23, 2010, at A12;
220. Tim Hoover, Governor Signs on with Secure Communities Program, Denver Post, Jan. 5, 2011, at A1;
221. Julia Preston, Immigration Program is Rejected By 3rd State, N. Y. Times, June 7, 2011, at A13;
222. Kirk Semple, Paterson and Federal Officials Reach Pact on Immigration, N. Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2010, at A19.
223. Rhonda Bodfield, Brewer Rides to Easy Win Over Goddard for Top Job, Ariz. Daily Star, Nov. 3, 2010, at A9.
224. See, e.g., Peter Schrag, Bashing "Them" Again; Republican Steve Poizner Hopes that Waving the Bloody Shirt of the Illegal Immigration Issue will Close the Gap on Meg Whitman, LA. Times, Mar. 21, 2010, at A31;
225. George Skelton, Whitman Paid a High Price for Latino Distrust of GOP, LA. Times, Dec. 20, 2010, at A2.
226. Julia Preston, U. S. Pledges to Raise Deportation Threhold, N. Y. Times, June 18, 2011, at A14 (quoting John Morton, Director of ICE). For the specific terms of the new policy
227. see Memorandum from John Morton on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens, June 17, 2011, www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf
228. See Pew Hispanic Center, Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States, 2009, ttbl. 14(2010), pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/hispanics2009/ Table14.pdf;
229. William H. Frey, Will Arizona Be America's Future? (online posting, Apr. 28, 2010), www.brookings.edu/opinions/20io/o428-arizona-frey.aspx.
230. See Marc Lacey & Katherine Q. Seelye, Recall Election Claims Arizona Anti-Immigration Champion, N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, 2011, at A22.