Credible commitment in carbon policy

Climate Policy

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 255-271

  Brunner, Steffen ^a   Flachsland, Christian ^a   Marschinski, Robert ^a,b  

^a POTSDAM INSTITUTE FOR CLIMATE IMPACT RESEARCH   (Germany)

^b TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

carbon pricing; climate policy frameworks; incentive mechanisms; regulatory uncertainty

Indexed keywords

ABATEMENT COST; CARBON EMISSION; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; GOVERNANCE APPROACH; INCENTIVE; REGULATORY APPROACH;

EID: 84860751298     PISSN: 14693062     EISSN: 17527457     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2011.582327     Document Type: Review

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