The notion of a rational convex program, and an algorithm for the arrow-debreu nash bargaining game

Journal of the ACM

Volumn 59, Issue 2, 2012, Pages

  Vazirani, Vijay V ^a  

^a Georgia Institute of Technology   (United States)

Author keywords

Algorithms; Economics; Theory

Indexed keywords

ALLOCATION PROBLEMS; COMBINATORIAL ALGORITHM; CONVEX PROGRAMS; MARKET MODEL; NASH BARGAINING GAME; OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS; POLYNOMIAL-TIME ALGORITHMS; THEORY; WIRELESS CHANNEL;

ALGORITHMS; CONVEX PROGRAMMING; ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY;

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS;

EID: 84860598694     PISSN: 00045411     EISSN: 1557735X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/2160158.2160160     Document Type: Article

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