Rationality and strongly polynomial solvability of Eisenberg-Gale markets with two agents

SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 1117-1136

  Chakrabarty, Deeparnab ^a   Devanur, Nikhil R ^b   Vazirani, Vijay V ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WATERLOO   (Canada)

^b MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^c Georgia Institute of Technology   (United States)

Author keywords

Convex programs; Market equilibrium; Strongly polynomial algorithms

Indexed keywords

BINARY SEARCH; CAPACITY ALLOCATION; CONVEX PROGRAMS; DIRECTED GRAPHS; DIRECTED NETWORK; DUALITY THEOREMS; LINEAR PROGRAMS; MARKET EQUILIBRIA; NETWORK CODING; OPEN PROBLEMS; POLYTOPES; PRIMAL-DUAL SCHEMATA; STRONGLY POLYNOMIAL ALGORITHM; STRONGLY POLYNOMIAL TIME ALGORITHM; STRONGLY POLYNOMIALS; TWO SOURCES;

ALGORITHMS; COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; INFORMATION THEORY; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

COMMERCE;

EID: 77958083703     PISSN: 08954801     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1137/070693072     Document Type: Article

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