Political pluralism, public policies, and organizational choices: Banking branch expansion in India, 1948-2003

Academy of Management Journal

Volumn 55, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 339-359

  Kozhikode, Rajiv Krishnan ^a   Li, Jiatao ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

^b HONG KONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860509360     PISSN: 00014273     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/amj.2010.0370     Document Type: Article

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