Learning from error: The theoretical significance of experimental knowledge

Modern Schoolman

Volumn 87, Issue 3-4, 2010, Pages 191-217

  Mayo, Deborah ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84860380644     PISSN: 00268402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/schoolman2010873/45     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (30)

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