The Effect of Gender-Based Returns to Borrowing on Intra-Household Resource Allocation in Rural Bangladesh

World Development

Volumn 40, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 1164-1180

  Alam, Saad ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ST THOMAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Asia; Bangladesh; Gender; Intra household allocation; Microcredit; Rural borrowing

Indexed keywords

CREDIT PROVISION; DECISION MAKING; EMPOWERMENT; GENDER ROLE; HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE; HOUSEHOLD INCOME; INCOME DISTRIBUTION; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; RURAL FINANCE; SELF EMPLOYMENT; WOMENS STATUS;

BANGLADESH;

EID: 84860325341     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.12.009     Document Type: Article

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