Kant on respect, dignity, and the duty of respect

Kant's Ethics of Virtue

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 175-199

  Darwall, Stephen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

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EID: 84860303317     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1515/9783110209655     Document Type: Chapter

References (53)

1. Immanuel Kant, 1996, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in: Mary Gregor, trans. and ed., Practical Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Further references will be to volume and page number of the canonical Preussische Akademie edition and placed parenthetically in the text (hereafter abbreviated as G).
2. Kant, 1996, Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Philosophy (hereafter abbreviated as CPrR)
3. Kant, 1996, Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Virtue (Metaphysics of Morals), in Practical Philosophy (hereafter abbreviated as MM)
4. I was initially set thinking along these lines by conversations with Oliver Sensen
5. Oliver Sensen, 2004, "Kants Begriff der Menschenwürde" in: F.-J. Bormann/ C. Schrçer (eds.), Abwägende Vernunft, Berlin: De Gruyter, pp. 220 - 236
6. Sensen, 2004, "Freedom and the Categorical Imperative: Kant's Conception of Human Dignity," Ph. D. Diss, Cambridge University, which brings out some of the complexities, along with a very interesting account of the history of the conception of dignity by which Kant was himself influenced.
7. Stephen Massey, 1983, "Kant on Self-Respect", in: Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 21, pp. 57 -74.
8. Christine Korsgaard, 1996, "Kant's Formula of Humanity", in: Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 114- 132.
9. Arthur Melnick, 2002, "Kant's Formulations of the Categorical Imperative", in: Kant-Studien, vol. 93, pp. 291 - 308.
10. Andrews Reath, 1989, "Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility: Respect for the Moral Law and the Influence of Inclination", in: Kant-Studien, vol. 80, pp. 284- 302
11. Patrick Frierson, 2005, "Kant's Empirical Account of Human Action", in: Philosophers' Imprint, 5,.
12. As I note in the next paragraph, Kant contrasts reverentia with observantia or practical respect, a form of respect that is manifested in the agent's maxim. As we shall also see, the duty of respect concerns observantia in the first instance, although, as with any moral duty, acting from this duty, or from the moral law that includes it, invariably involves reverentia, the feeling of respect, at the phenomenal level.
13. [MM 6: 464]
14. Darwall, 1977, "Two Kinds of Respect", in: Ethics, vol. 88, pp. 36 -49.
15. It is worth noting that there presumably must be both noumenal and phenomenal counterparts of the esteem (later, respect) that responds to merit also
16. Also: "[W]e ... represent a certain sublimity and dignity in the person who fulfills all his duties" [G 4: 440]
17. Thomas E. Hill, Jr., 1991, "Humanity as an End in Itself ", in: Ethics, vol. 80, pp. 84- 99
18. Christine Korsgaard, 1996, "Kant's Formula of Humanity", in: Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
19. Allen Wood, 1999, Kant's Ethical Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 111- 155.
20. It would be interesting, however, to consider whether there might be one that fits with the passages I have mentioned when they are taken at face value
21. This is sometimes called the "backgrounding" of desire. On this important feature of practical reason.
22. Stephen Darwall, 1983, Impartial Reason, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press
23. Philip Pettit, Michael Smith, 1990, "Backgrounding Desire", in: The Philosophical Review, vol. 99, pp. 565 - 592
24. T. M. Scanlon, 1998, What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 41 - 55
25. Jonathan Dancy, 2000, Practical Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press
26. "Arrogance (superbia and, as this word expresses it, the inclination to be always on top) is a kind of ambition (ambitio) in which we demand that others think little of themselves in comparison with us" [MM 6: 465]. For a fascinating discussion of the role of the "wish to be God" in Kant's philosophy generally
27. Susan Neiman, 2002, Evil in Modern Thought: an Alternative History of Philosophy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 57 -84.
28. For an insightful account of Kant's ethics that stresses the role of self-conceit, Wood, 1999
29. Arguably, all of us indulge in this fantasy in some way or other. There are fascinating issues here concerning the interaction with Kant's views on radical evil in Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason that I cannot get into here. For a fascinating discussion.
30. Robert Gressis, Kant's Theory of Evil: An Interpretation and Defense, 2007, University of Michigan, Ph.D. Diss.
31. John Rawls, 1980, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 77, p. 546.
32. discuss these matters at much greater length in Stephen Darwall, 2006, The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, on which I here draw
33. gent-neutral reasons contrast with agent-relative reasons, whose formulation includes an ineliminable reference to the agent for whom they are reasons (like "that it will keep a promise I made," "that it will avoid harm to others (i.e., people other than me)", and so on). Agent-neutral reasons can be stated without such a reference: "that it would prevent some pain from occurring to someone (or some being)." On the distinction between agent-relative (also called "subjective" or "agent-centered") and agent-neutral (also called "objective") reasons, principles, values, etc.
34. Thomas Nagel, 1970, The Possibility of Altruism, Oxford: Clarendon Press
35. Samuel Scheffler, 1982, The Rejection of Consequentialism, Oxford: Clarendon Press
36. Derek Parfit, 1984, Reasons and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press
37. Stephen Darwall, 1986, "Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out", in: Philosophical Studies, vol. 50, pp. 291- 319.
38. There are, of course, ways of accepting demands, say out of self-interest in a negotiation, that are different from accepting something as a valid demand
39. Unless, of course, we interpret 'may not' to entail 'responsible to one another notto'. But then we would have to ask what within Kant's framework in the Groundwork or The Critique of Practical Reason will license or legitimate the claim thus interpreted.
40. Joel Feinberg, 1980, "The Nature and Value of Rights," in: Rights, Justice, and the Bounds of Liberty, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
41. Marcia Baron, 2002, "Love and Respect in The Doctrine of Virtue", in: Mark Timmons (ed.), Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Press; for a critical discussion of this aspect of Kant's views.
42. P. F. Strawson, 1968, "Freedom and Resentment", in: Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action, London: Oxford University Press, p. 93.
43. The Second-Person Standpoint for the development and defense of this idea
44. In The Second-Person Standpoint, especially Chapters 9 and 12
45. For an excellent discussion of Kant's ethics from this perspective
46. Christine Korsgaard's "Creating the Kingdom of Ends", in: Creating the Kingdom of Ends
47. Christine Korsgaard, 1996, "Two Distinctions in Goodness, and Kant's Formula of Humanity", in: Creating the Kingdom of Ends
48. Christine Korsgaard, 1996, The Sources of Normativity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
49. Allen Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought. For criticism.
50. Rachel Cohon, 2000, "The Roots of Reason", The Philosophical Review, vol. 109, pp. 63- 85
51. Samuel Kerstein, 2001, Korsgaard's Kantian Arguments for the Value of Humanity", in: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 31, pp. 23- 52.
52. In Chapter 10 of The Second-Person Standpoint
53. In Chapter 11 of The Second-Person Standpoint