Korsgaard's Kantian arguments for the value of humanity

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 23-52

  Kerstein, Samuel J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84881684063     PISSN: 00455091     EISSN: 19110820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.2001.10717559     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, O. O'Neill, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 123.
2. See Christine Korsgaard, 'Kant's Formula of Humanity', Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 106-32.
3. See Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, J. Ellington, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett 1993), 428-9, cited henceforth as GMS.
4. See Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism (New York: Oxford University Press 1996), 62-80.
5. See FH 111 and Korsgaard, 'Motivation, Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self', Ethics 109(1998), 55.
6. For a summary of the regressive argument, see Christine Korsgaard, 'Two Distinctions in Goodness', Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 256-62.
7. See also Korsgaard, 'Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value', Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 239-43.
8. See, for example, Thomas E. Hill, Jr., 'Humanity as an End in Itself', Ethics 91 (1980) 84-90
9. and Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism.
10. Korsgaard, 'Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value', 227.
11. The places are Lecture 4 of SN, especially 131-45 and Korsgaard, 'The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values', Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 275-310.
12. For criticism of Lecture 4 and of "The Reasons We Can Share, '
13. see Vasilis Politas, 'Reasons and Values', International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (1997) 426-47.
14. This example stems from Berys Gaut, 'The Structure of Practical Reason' in Ethics and Practical Reason, Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997), 174.
15. For a recent criticism of Kant's argument especially as a response to the kind of value realism I have discussed, see Berys Gaut, 'The Structure of Practical Reason', 165-70.
16. See Gaut, The Structure of Practical Reason. '
17. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, N. Kemp Smith, trans. (New York: St. Martin's Press 1965), A 806, B 834.
18. See, for example, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Lewis White Beck, trans. (New York: Macmillan 1993), 20 (Preussische Akademie edition [vol. V] 22).
19. See Korsgaard, 'Kant's Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Groundwork I', Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 60-1.
20. For discussion of this sort of interpretation of what Kant means by a good will, see Karl Ameriks 'Kant on the Good Will', Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten: Ein kooperativer Kommentar, O. Höffe, ed. (Frankfurt: Klostermann 1989), 54-9.
21. John Skorupski, 'Rescuing Moral Obligation', European Journal of Philosophy 6 (1998) 348-50.