It is Hobbes, not Rousseau: An experiment on voting and redistribution

Experimental Economics

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 278-308

  Cabrales, Antonio ^a,b   Nagel, Rosemarie ^c   Rodriguez Mora J V ^b,d  

^a UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^b CEPR   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

^d UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Experiments; Multiple equilibria; Political equilibrium; Redistribution; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860213589     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-011-9300-x     Document Type: Article

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