The political economy of dodd-frank: Why financial reform tends to be frustrated and systemic risk perpetuated

Cornell Law Review

Volumn 97, Issue 5, 2012, Pages 1019-1082

  Coffee, John C ^a  

^a Columbia University Law School ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84860167056     PISSN: 00108847     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (7)

1. Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 849-51 (1997).
2. John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 281-86 (2004).
3. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1786-88 (2011)
4. David Milstead, A Desperate Obama Kicks Investor Protection to the Curb, GLOBE AND MAIL, Oct. 18, 2011, at B19.
5. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney As Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003).
6. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers' Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 255-74 (2010);
7. Lucian A. Bebchuk et. al., The Wages of Failure: Executive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 273-76 (2010). lehman 2000-2008