Values, mechanism design, and fairness

Moral Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 228-255

  Goodenough, Oliver R ^a,b,c  

^a VERMONT LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^b Gruter Institute for Law   (United States)

^c DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859826744     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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