Outstanding in the field: Evaluating auction markets for farmland using multi-agent simulation

JASSS

Volumn 15, Issue 1, 2012, Pages

  Arsenault, Adam ^a,b   Nolan, James ^b,c   Schoney, Richard ^a,b   Gilchrist, Donald ^b,c  

^a AGRICULTURE AND AGRI FOOD CANADA   (Canada)

^b University of Saskatchewan ^*  (Canada)

^c UNIVERSITY OF SASKATCHEWAN   (Canada)

Author keywords

Agriculture; Auctions; Multi agent simulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859593604     PISSN: 14607425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.18564/jasss.1827     Document Type: Article

References (18)

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