Fiscal federalism in Germany: Stabilization and redistribution before and after unification

Publius

Volumn 42, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 234-259

  Hepp, Ralf ^a   Von Hagen, Jürgen ^b  

^a FORDHAM UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84859565510     PISSN: 00485950     EISSN: 17477107     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/publius/pjr004     Document Type: Article

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