Principled chances

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

Volumn 54, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 27-41

  Schaffer, Jonathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 3843096957     PISSN: 00070882     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/bjps/54.1.27     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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6. Black, R. [1998]: 'Chance, Credence, and the Principal Principle', The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 49, pp. 371-85.
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13. Lewis, D. [1993]: 'Many, but Almost One', in K. Campbell, J. Bacon and L. Reinhardt (eds), Ontology, Causality, and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D. M. Armstrong, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 23-38.
14. Lewis, D. [1994]: 'Humean Supervenience Debugged', Mind, 103, pp. 473-90.
15. Lewis, D. [2000]: 'Causation as Influence', The Journal of Philosophy, 98, pp. 182-97.
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18. Shoemaker, S. [1980]: 'Causality and Properties', in P. Van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
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