Constitutional Negotiations in Federal Reforms: Interests, Interaction Orientation and the Prospect of Agreement

Regional and Federal Studies

Volumn 21, Issue 4-5, 2011, Pages 407-425

  Lorenz, Astrid ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG   (Germany)

Author keywords

Constitutional negotiations; federalism; interaction orientation; political reforms

Indexed keywords

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM; DECISION MAKING; FEDERAL SYSTEM; INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS; NUMERICAL MODEL; POLITICAL REFORM; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

EID: 84859010797     PISSN: 13597566     EISSN: 17439434     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13597566.2011.578891     Document Type: Article

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