Towards a more judicial approach? Eu antitrust fines under the scrutiny of fundamental rights

Common Market Law Review

Volumn 48, Issue 5, 2011, Pages 1405-1416

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EID: 84858817703     PISSN: 01650750     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Editorial

References (49)

1. Coppel and O'Neill, " The European Court of Justice:Taking Rights Seriously?" , 29CML Rev. (1992) 669.
2. Weiler and Lockhart, " 'Taking Rights Seriously' Seriously: The European Court and its fundamental rights jurisprudence" , Parts I and II, 32 CML Rev. (1995) 51 and 579.
3. Cf. e.g. Joined Cases C- 92&93/09, Volker and Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v. Land Hessen, judgment of 9 Nov. 2010, nyr.
4. Montag, " The Case for a Radical Reform of the Infringement Procedure under Regulation 17" , 17 ECL Rev. (1996) 428, at 429.
5. EEC Council Regulation No. 17: First Regulation implementingArticles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, O.J. (English spec. ed.), Chapter I, Series 1959-1962, 87.
6. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation or the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, O.J. 2003, L 1/1.
7. Commission Regulation (EC) No. 773/2004 relating to the conduct of proceedings by the Commission pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, O.J. 2004, L 123/18.
8. Available on ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html.
9. Commission Decision of 23 May 2001 on the terms and reference of hearing officers in certain competition proceedings, O.J. 2001, L 162/21.
10. Cf. also the Guidance on procedures of the Hearing Officers in proceedings relating to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU (ex Arts. 81 and 82 EC), available on ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/legislation.html.
11. Cf. Andreangeli, EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights (Edward Elgar, 2008), pp. 92-151.
12. As to legal professional privilege, cf. also Di Federico, case note on Case C-550/07 P, Akzo Nobel Ltd and Akros Chemicals Ltd v. Commission, 48 CML Rev. (2011), 581.
13. Critical assessments of the status quo abound
14. See e.g. Edward, " Quality Control of Competition Decisions" , in Bultermann, Hancher, McDonnell and Sevenster (Eds.), Views of European Law from the Mountain, Liber Amicorum Piet Jan Slot (Kluwer, 2009), p. 143.
15. Forrester, " A bush in need of pruning: The luxuriant growth of 'Light Judicial Review'" , in Ehlermann and Marquis (Eds.), European Competition Annual 2009: The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (Hart Publishing, 2011), p. 407.
16. Forrester, " A challenge for Europe's judges: The review of fines in competition cases" , 36 EL Rev. (2011) 185.
17. Schwarze, Bechtold and Bosch, " Deficiencies in European Community Competition Law: Critical analysis of the current practice and proposals for change" (2008, available on www.gleisslutz.com/de/publikationen/nachanwalt.html?nDisplayJur=49).
18. Sibony, Le juge et le raisonnement économique en droit de la concurrence (L.G.D.J., 2008).
19. Sibony and Barbier de la Serre, " Charge de la preuve et théorie du contrôle en droit communautaire de la concurrence: Pour un changement de perspective" , 43 RTDE (2007), 205
20. Slater, Thomas and Waelbroeck, " Competition law proceedings before the European Commission and the right to a fair trial: No need for reform?" , 5 European Competition Journal (2009), 97
21. Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, O.J. 2006, C 210/2; preceded by the Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the ECSC Treaty, O.J. 1998, C 9/3.
22. Commission notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, O.J. 2006, C 298/17.
23. Cf. Case C-97/08 P, Akzo Nobel N.V. and Others v. Commission, [2009] ECR I-8237.
24. Cf. Roth, " The 'More Economic Approach' and the Rule of Law" , in Schmidtchen, Albert and Voigt (Eds.), The More Economic Approach to European Competition Law (Mohr Siebeck, 2007), p. 37.
25. Judgment of 8 June 1976, Engel and Others v. The Netherlands, A/22, para 82.
26. Judgment of 23 Nov. 2006, Application No. 73053/01, Jussila v. Finland, paras. 30-31.
27. Case C-199/92 P, Hüls AG v. Commission, [1999] ECR I-4287 para 150; Joined Cases C-189/02 P etc., Dansk Rørindustri A/S and Others v. Commission, [2005] ECR I-5425 para 202.
28. Judgment of 21 May 2003, Janosevic v. Sweden, Application No. 34619/97, para 81.
29. For a more comprehensive analysis of the requirements under Art. 6(1) ECHR, cf. A.G. Mengozzi, Opinion of 17 Feb. 2011 in Case C-521/09 P, Elf Aquitaine SA v. Commission, pending, paras. 30-37.
30. Wils, " The Increased Level of EUAntitrust Fines, Judicial Review and the European Convention on Human Rights" , 33 World Comp. (2010), 6, at pp. 12-18.
31. See also Case T-138/07, Schindler Holding Ltd and Others v. Commission, judgment of 13 July 2011, nyr, paras. 49-59.
32. As has rightly been pointed out byWils, op. cit. supra note 19, at p. 24 note 89.
33. Arts. 32 and 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
34. Art. 65 of the General Court's Rules of Procedure.
35. Arts. 24 and 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice.
36. This doctrine has been discussed in this journal by Bailey, " Scope of review under Article 81 EC" , 41 CML Rev. (2004), 1327.
37. Fritzsche, " Discretion, scope of judicial review and institutional balance in European law" , 47 CML Rev. (2010), 361.
38. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Consten and Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR 299, 347; Case 26/76, Metro SB-Grossmärkte v. Commission, [1977] ECR 1875, paras. 45 and 50; Case C-42/84, Remia v. Commission, [1985] ECR 2545 para 34; Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, British American Tobacco Company v. Commission, [1987] ECR 4487, para 62. This doctrine was apparently inspired by Art. 33(1) ECSC.
39. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, [2007] ECR II-3601 para 87.
40. Judgment of 21 July 2011, Sigma Radio Television Ltd. v. Cyprus, Applications Nos. 32181/04 and 35122/05, paras. 156-157.
41. Exceptions are Case T-43/92, Dunlop Slazenger v. Commission, [1994] ECR II-441; Case T-191/98, Atlantic Container Line v. Commission, [2003] ECR II-3275; Case T-236/01, Tokai Carbon v. Commission, [2004] ECR II-1181.
42. Case T-127/04, KME Germany AG and Others v. Commission, [2009] ECR II-1167.
43. Opinion of 10 Feb. 2011, Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany and Others v. Commission, pending, para 74.
44. This seems to be the case in KME; see A.G. Sharpston's Opinion, previous note, para 123: " even if other matters could have been raised - concerning, for example, the possible need to explain why the overall starting amount was EUR 58.1 million, rather than EUR 20 million or EUR 100 million - they were not, and the General Court addressed the matters which were raised in a manner which in no way suggests that it was not exercising its full jurisdiction as required by the ECHR."
45. Case C-303/05, Advocaten voor deWereld VZW v. Leden van de Ministerraad, [2007] ECR I-3633, para 50 (emphasis added).
46. Case T-297/02, Evonik Degussa GmbH v. Commission, [2006] ECR II-897, paras. 74-83; Case C-266/06 P, Evonik Degussa GmbH v. Commission, not published, paras. 50-54
47. Art. 23(2) and (3) Regulation 1/2003.
48. Cf. Case COMP/C-3/37.990 - Intel, para 1760.
49. For a broader survey, cf. Essens, Gerbrandy and Lavrijssen (Eds.), National Courts and the Standard of Review in Competition Law and Economic Regulation (Europa Law Publishing, 2009).