A challenge for Europe's judges: The review of fines in competition cases

European Law Review

Volumn 36, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 185-207

  Forrester, Ian S ^a  

^a Scots Bar ^*  (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Appeals; Competition policy; Court of Justice of the European Union; EU law; European Commission; Fines; Judicial review; Proportionality

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053204854     PISSN: 03075400     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (198)

1. WEA Filipacchi ECU 60, 000 (FRF 333, 257) ([1972] OJ L303/52);
2. GM Continental ECU 100, 000 (BEF 5, 000, 000) ([1975] OJ L29/14;
3. Miller ECU 70, 000 (DM 256, 200) ([1976] OJ L357/40);
4. AROW/BNIC ECU 160, 000 (FRF 1, 049, 144) ([1982] OJ L379/1);
5. Moët & Chandon ECU 1, 100, 000 (GBP 624, 977, 10) ([1982] OJ L94/7).
6. On the deterrence point see also W. Wils, "Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice" (2006) 29 World Competition 183;
7. European Competitions Authorities' (ECA) Working Group Paper on Sanctions published in May 2008, at http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/eca- principles-uk.pdf [Accessed March 3, 2011];
8. and F. de la Torre, "The 2006 Guidelines on Fines: Reflections on the Commission's Practice" (2010) 33 World Competition 359, an excellent summary of Commission theories on the subject of fining policy and deterrence.
9. See also J. Connor and R. Lande, "The Size of Cartel Overcharges: Implications for US and EU Fining Policies" (Winter 2006) 51 Antitrust Bull. 983;
10. R. White, "'Civil Penalties': Oxymoron, Chimera and Stealth Sanction" (2010) 126 L. Q. R. 593.
11. Regulation 17, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, as amended [1962] OJ 13/204.
12. Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2004] OJ L1/1.
13. Article 15 (2) of Regulation 17/1962 and art.23 (2) of Regulation 1/2003. See for example Musique Diffusion française v Commission (Pioneer) (100/80) [1983] E. C. R. 1825;
14. [1983] 3 C. M. L. R. 221 at [119], regarding the non-limitation to the product turnover;
15. Tipp-Ex v EC Commission (C-279/87) [1990] E. C. R. I-261 at [39], regarding the non-limitation to EEA turnover.
16. Case IV/26.045-Quinine [1969] OJ L192/5: horizontal market sharing, quota arrangements and price fixing-the Commission's first cartel case.
17. See ACF Chemiefarma NV v Commission of the European Communities (Quinine) (41/69) [1970] E. C. R. 661 at [153];
18. Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v Commission of the European Communities (45/69) [1970] E. C. R. 769 at [44];
19. and Buchler & Co v Commission of the European Communities (44/69) [1970] E. C. R. 733 at [40].
20. See, e.g. Case IV/27.010-Deutsche Philips GmbH [1973] OJ L293/40 (ECU 60, 000;
21. DM 219, 600) and Case IV.29.430-Kawasaki [1979] OJ L16/9 (ECU 100, 000; GBP 67, 081.40).
22. Case IV.29.595-Pioneer Hi-Fi Equipment [1980] OJ L60/21.
23. Some of the fines represented up to 4% of the companies' total turnover, whereas prior to Pioneer, fines were steadfastly pegged at below 2% of the total turnover of an undertaking. See Opinion of A. G. Sir Gordon Slynn in Pioneer (100/80) [1983] E. C. R. 1825 at 1946.
24. Case IV.29.595-Pioneer Hi-Fi Equipment [1980] OJ L60/21.
25. Pioneer (100/80) [1983] E. C. R. 1825 at [104]-[108]: "conduct of that kind can only be deterred by fines which are heavier than in the past". However, the Court reduced the fines to ECU 3, 200, 000 on the grounds that the Commission had incorrectly assessed the duration of the infringement; see [123]-[124] of the judgment ("The duration of the concerted practices established by the Court will enter into the general assessment to be made by it within the framework of its powers of unlimited jurisdiction").
26. XIII Report on Competition Policy (1983).
27. XIII Report on Competition Policy (1983), paras 62-66.
28. Commission Notice on immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases [2002] OJ C45/3-5.
29. The previous leniency notice (1996 Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases [1996] OJ C207/4) did not encourage many leniency applications.
30. See L. Ortiz Blanco, EC Competition Procedure (Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 477.
31. At February 3, 2011; see European Commission, Cartel Statistics, at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf [Accessed March 3, 2011].
32. See also http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html [Accessed March 23, 2011].
33. Case No IV/32.879-Viho/Toshiba [1991] OJ L287/39.
34. Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 15 (2) Regulation 17 [1998] OJ C9/3.
35. COMP/E-1/37.512-Vitamins [2003] OJ L6/01 (Hoffman La Roche AG was fined €462 million).
36. L. Ortiz Blanco, EC Competition Procedure, supra, p. 477.
37. Michelin v Commission (T-203/01) [2003] E. C. R. II-4071;
38. [2004] 4 C. M. L. R. 18 at [292].
39. Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23 (2) (a) of Regulation 1/2003 [2006] OJ C210/2.
40. J. Killick, "The 2006 Fining Guidelines: Two Steps Forward but One Step Back?", Competition Law Insight, September 26, 2006.
41. European Commission, Cartel Statistics, at http://ec.europa.eu/ competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf [Accessed March 3, 2011].
42. Case COMP/37.792-Microsoft [2007] OJ L32/23.
43. Case COMP/37.990-Intel [2009] OJ C227/13.
44. Figures, to the nearest million, are derived from Commission decisions and the author's annual reviews of EC Competition Law in the Yearbook of European Law (Oxford University Press, 1981).
45. Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23 (2) (a) of Regulation 1/2003 [2006] OJ C210, which refer to the objective of deterrence at paras 4, 7, 25, 30, 37.
46. Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003 (SEC (2009) 574 final), April 29, 2009, paras 124-125.
47. See for instance Commissioner Almunia's speech "Competition and consumers: the future of EU competition policy", European Competition Day, Madrid, May 12, 2010.
48. See also former Competition Commissioner Kroes's speech "The Lessons Learned" at the 36th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham University New York, September 24, 2009: "Fines were not deterrent in previous decades. Just think about that for a moment ⋯ year after year we would catch a cartel and impose a fine that would have little or no effect on a company's incentives. What is the point of that? Now ⋯ we fine in order to deter, linking the fine to the relevant sales of the infringing company. If we catch recidivists - the French glass company Saint-Gobain is a good example - the fine increases are severe. So, in adopting a clear policy basis for deterrent fines and a focus on the most serious infringements of course the fines have increased!"
49. Pioneer (100/80) [1983] E. C. R. 1825;
50. see also Dansk Rørindustri v Commission (C 189/02 P, C 202/02 P, C 205/02 P to C 208/02 P and C 213/02 P) [2005] E. C. R. I-5425;
51. [2005] C. M. L. R. 17 at [169];
52. Archer Daniels Midland v Commission (C-510/06 P) [2009] E. C. R. I-1843;
53. [2009] 4 C. M. L. R. 20.
54. Pioneer (100/80) [1983] E. C. R. 1825 at [109].
55. See Opinion of A. G. Sir Gordon Slynn in Pioneer (100/80) [1983] E. C. R. 1825 at 1946-1947.
56. See Opinion of A. G. Sir Gordon Slynn in Pioneer (100/80) [1983] E. C. R. 1825 at 1946-1947;
57. see also HFB v Commission (T-9/99) [2002] E. C. R. II-1487 at [418]
58. and LR AF 1998 v Commission (T-23/99) [2002] E. C. R. II-1705;
59. [2002] 5 C. M. L. R. 10 at [27] ("[the guidelines] determine, generally and abstractly, the method which the Commission has bound itself to use in assessing the fines imposed by the decision and, consequently, ensure legal certainty on the part of the undertakings").
60. William Prym GmbH & Co KG and Prym Consumer GmbH & Co KG v Commission (C-534/07 P) [2009] E. C. R. I-7415;
61. [2009] 5 C. M. L. R. 21 at [86]
62. (citing Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij v Commission (C-238/99 P) [2002] E. C. R. I-8375;
63. [2003] 4 C. M. L. R. 10 at [692]) (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
64. A slightly different formula is to be found in BASF and UCB v Commission (T-101/05 and T-111/05) [2007] E. C. R.-II-4949;
65. [2008] 4 C. M. L. R. 13 ("by virtue of the unlimited jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, the Community judicature is empowered, in addition to carrying out a mere review of the lawfulness of the penalty, to substitute its own appraisal for the Commission's and, consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase the fine or penalty payment imposed where the question of the amount of the fine is before it. In that context, it must be borne in mind that the Guidelines are without prejudice to the assessment of the fine by the Community judicature when it exercises that unlimited jurisdiction. ") (Emphasis added.)
66. See I. Forrester, "A Bush in Need of Pruning: the Luxuriant Growth of 'Light Judicial Review'" in C. D. Ehlermann and M. Marquis (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2009: Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011).
67. See for example Groupe Danone v Commission (Belgian Beer) (T-38/02) [2005] E. C. R. II-4407;
68. [2006] 4 C. M. L. R. 25
69. (upheld on appeal in (C-3/06 P) Groupe Danone v Commission [2007] E. C. R. I-1331;
70. [2007] 4 C. M. L. R. 18 at [53]-[54] and [61]).
71. See Quinine (41/69) [1970] E. C. R. 661 at [176] and [180]-[188].
72. Quinine (41/69) [1970] E. C. R. 661 at [188];
73. Boehringer v Commission (45/69) [1970] E. C. R. 769 at [59];
74. and Buchler v Commission (44/69) [1970] E. C. R. 733 at [57].
75. Opinion of A. G. Gand in Quinine (41/69) [1970] E. C. R. 661.
76. Pioneer (100/80) [1983] E. C. R. 1825 at [123]-[124].
77. Pioneer (100/80) [1983] E. C. R. 1825 at [123]-[124].
78. Pioneer (100/80) [1983] E. C. R. 1825 at [131]-[135].
79. Dunlop Slazenger International Ltd v Commission (T-43/92) [1994] E. C. R. II-441 at [178]-[179] (emphasis added).
80. Brasserie Nationale v Commission (T-49/02 to T-51/02) [2005] E. C. R. II-3033;
81. [2006] 4 C. M. L. R. 8 at [169]-[170] (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
82. Parker Pen v Commission (T-77/92) [1994] E. C. R. II-549;
83. [1995] 5 C. M. L. R. 435 at [92]-[95].
84. Ventouris Group Enterprises SA v Commission (T-59/99) [2003] E. C. R. II-2519;
85. [2005] 5 C. M. L. R. 29.
86. Ventouris (T-59/99) [2003] E. C. R. II-2519 at [217].
87. Ventouris (T-59/99) [2003] E. C. R. II-2519 at [219].
88. BASF AG v Commission (Vitamins) (T-15/02) [2006] E. C. R. II-497;
89. [2006] 5 C. M. L. R. 2.
90. Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Commission (Austrian Banks) (T-259/02 to T-264/02 and T-271/02) [2006] E. C. R. II-5169;
91. [2007] 5 C. M. L. R. 13.
92. See for example Tokai Carbon v Commission (Specialty graphite) (T-71/03, T-74/03, T-87/03 and T-91/03) [2005] E. C. R. II-10;
93. [2005] 5 C. M. L. R. 13;
94. Belgian Beer (T-38/02) [2005] E. C. R. II-4407;
95. FNCBV v Commission of the European Communities (French beef) (T-217/03 and T-245/03) [2006] E. C. R. II-4987;
96. [2005] 5 C. M. L. R. 5;
97. and Vitamins (T-15/02) [2006] E. C. R. II-497;
98. Degussa v Commission (Methionine) (T-279/02) [2006] E. C. R. II-897;
99. [2008] 5 C. M. L. R. 1 where proportionality pleas were dismissed.
100. Erste Group Bank AG v Commission (C-125/07 P) [2009] E. C. R. I-8681
101. [2010] 5 C. M. L. R. 9 at [187];
102. see also Società Finanziaria Siderurgica Finsider v Commission (C-320/92 P) [1994] E. C. R. I-5697 at [45]-[46];
103. BPB Industries and British Gypsum v Commission (C-310/93 P) [1995] E. C. R. I-865;
104. [1997] 4 C. M. L. R. 238 at [34];
105. Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij v Commission (C-238/99 P) [2002] E. C. R. I-8375 at [617].
106. Vitamins (T-15/02) [2006] E. C. R. II-497 at 582 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). This BASF judgment is probably wrong as it contradicts the notion of unlimited jurisdiction.
107. BASF and UCB v Commission (Choline chloride) (T-101/05 and T-111/05) [2007] E. C. R. II-4949;
108. [2008] 4 C. M. L. R. 13 at [128] (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
109. Tokai Carbon v Commission (T-236/01, T-239/01, T-244/01 to T-246/01, T-251/01 and T-252/01) [2004] E. C. R. II-1181;
110. [2004] 5 C. M. L. R. 28 at [371] (emphasis added, internal citations omitted);
111. upheld on appeal SGL Carbon v Commission (C-328/05 P) [2007] E. C. R. I-3921;
112. [2007] 5 C. M. L. R. 1 at [88].
113. Wieland-Werke v Commission (T-116/04) [2009] E. C. R. II-1087 at [32]-[33].
114. See also Scandinavian Airlines System v Commission (T-241/01) [2005] E. C. R. II-2917 at [79] cited in Wieland-Werke ("It next has to be examined whether the Commission's assessment of the seriousness of the infringements, having regard to the three factors of their nature, the extent of the geographic market concerned and their actual impact on the market, is vitiated by obvious error.").
115. See Erste Group Bank (C-125/07 P) [2009] E. C. R. I-8681 at [187].
116. Degussa (T-279/02) [2006] E. C. R. II-897 at [95]
117. (citing Pioneer (100/80) [1983] E. C. R. 1825 at [120]) (emphasis added);
118. see also Erste Group Bank (C-125/07 P) [2009] E. C. R. I-8681 at [91]-[92].
119. Opinion of A. G. Tizzano in Dansk Rørindustri A/S (C-189/02 P) [2005] E. C. R. I-5425 (internal citations omitted).
120. Ventouris (T-59/99) [1999] E. C. R. II-2519.
121. Parker Pen (T-77/92) [1994] E. C. R. II-549.
122. See for example Cimenteries CBR SA v Commission (T-25/95) [2000] E. C. R. II-491;
123. [2000] 5 C. M. L. R. 204 where the Court held that the Commission had not adequately proved the participation of some undertakings in the unlawful agreement (notably Titan).
124. BASF and UCB (T-101/05 and T-111/05) [2007] E. C. R. II-4949. However, that came as the result of the General Court's rejection of the Commission's characterisation of a global and a European cartel arrangement as a single and continuous infringement. The Court concluded that the parties had "committed two separate infringements of Article 81 (1) EC and not a single continuous infringement". This had the result that the global arrangements became time-barred. As a consequence, BASF was no longer entitled to the 10% reduction in the fine for the information it had provided in relation to the global arrangements. This had the curious effect that, despite the shortened duration of the infringement, the overall level of the fine was increased by €54, 000.
125. See B. Vesterdorf, "The Court of Justice and Unlimited Jurisdiction: What Does it Mean in Practice?" (GCP, June 2009), pp. 2-3, at http://www.globalcompetitionpolicy.org/index.php?&id=2115&action=600 [Accessed March 3, 2011].
126. Wieland-Werke (T-116/04) [2009] E. C. R. II-1087 at [32]-[33].
127. LR AF 1998 (T-23/99) [2002] E. C. R. II-1705 at [231].
128. See I. Forrester, "Due Process in EC Competition Cases: A distinguished Institution with Flawed Procedures" (2009) 34 E. L. Rev. 817.
129. See also Working Paper and a Report of the Global Competition Law Centre (GCLC) of the College of Europe: D. Slater, S. Tomas and D. Waelbroeck, "Competition law proceedings before the European Commission and the right to afair trial: no need for reform?", Global Competition Law Centre Working Papers Series, GCLC Working Paper 04/08 (GCLC Working Paper) at http://www.coleurope.eu/content/gclc/documents/GCLC %20WP%2004-08.pdf [Accessed March 3, 2011]
130. also published in (April 2009) European Competition Journal 97;
131. for a robust alternative view, see F. Castillo de la Torre, "Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in Cartel Cases" in M. Marquis and C.-D. Ehlermann (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2009: The Evaluation of Evidence and its Judicial Review in Competition Cases (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011).
132. Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and Commission (C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P) [2008] E. C. R. I-6351;
133. [2008] 3 C. M. L. R. 41.
134. See for example Wils, "Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice" (2006) 29 World Competition 183 (2006).
135. Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG v Commission (T-112/98) [2001] E. C. R. II-729;
136. [2001] 5 C. M. L. R. 1 at [59].
137. Compare for instance the ECtHR's wide application of the privilege against self-incrimination, covering also indirect incrimination through the duty to respond to questions of fact which would establish an infringement, in Saunders v United Kingdom (1997) 23 E. H. R. R. 313
138. ECtHR with the ECJ's limited approach set out in 374/87 Orkem v Commission [1989] E. C. R. 3283 at [29].
139. This is discussed in Aslam and Ramsden, "EC Dawn Raids: A Human Rights Violation?" (2008) 5 Competition Law Review 61.
140. See also the review of Orkem by Forrester and Norall (1989) 9 Y. E. L. 305.
141. Article 6 (1) TEU.
142. Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, explanation on art.52. These explanations recording the legislator's intent are very relevant to the interpretation of the text of the CFR in the same way as the recitals are to the interpretation of a piece of legislation.
143. See for example, Apostolides v Orams (C-420/07) [2009] E. C. R. I-3571;
144. [2010] All E. R. (Comm) 959 at [73], which construes a regulation by reference to its recitals. Moreover, according to the Preamble of the CFR, the "Explanations" must be given "due regard".
145. Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights [2007] OJ C303/17, explanation on art.52.
146. See Opinion of A. G. Mayras in Boehringer v Commission (7/72) [1973] C. M. L. R. 864;
147. [1972] E. C. R. 1281 at 1302 ("Ainsi a-t-on pu affirmer que les amendes communautaires, formellement administratives, ont, au point de vue matériel, la nature de sanctions pénales");
148. Opinion of A. G. Vesterdorf in (T-1/89 to T-4/89, T-6/89 to T-15/89) Rhône Poulenc v Commission (C-185/95 P) [1991] E. C. R. II-867 at 885;
149. Opinion of A. G. Léger in Baustahlgewebe v Commission (C185/95 P) [1998] E. C. R. I-8417;
150. [1999] 4 C. M. L. R. 1203 at [31];
151. Opinion of A. G. Kokott in Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato v Ente Tabacchi Italiani - ETI SpA (C-280/06) [2007] E. C. R. I-10893;
152. [2008] 4 C. M. L. R. 11 at [71].
153. Engel v The Netherlands (1979-80) 1 E. H. R. R. 647 ECtHR at [82].
154. See Bendenoun v France (1994) 18 E. H. R. R. 54 ECtHR at [47];
155. Benham v United Kingdom (1996) 22 E. H. R. R. 293 ECtHR at [56];
156. Jussila v Finland (2007) 45 E. H. R. R. 39 ECtHR at [38] (emphasis added): "the tax surcharges were not intended as pecuniary compensation for damage but as a punishment to deter re-offending. It may therefore be concluded that the surcharges were imposed by a rule whose purpose was deterrent and punitive. Without more, the Court considers that this establishes the criminal nature of the offence. The minor nature of the penalty renders this case different from Janosevic and Bendenoun as regards the third Engel criterion but does not remove the matter from the scope of Article 6. Hence, Article 6 applies under its criminal head notwithstanding the minor nature of the tax surcharge."
157. See W. Wils, "The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review and the European Convention on Human Rights" (2010) 33 World Competition 12;
158. W. Wils, "Is Criminalisation of EU Competition Law the Answer?" (2005) 28 World Competition 4. One of the enjoyable features of the present important debate is reading such robustly written legal articles.
159. See study by Prof. Jürgen Schwarze with Dr Rainer Bechtold and Dr Wolfgang Bosch for Gleiss Lutz, "Deficiencies in European Competition Law - Critical analysis of the current practice and proposals for change" (2008), p. 23, at http://www.gleisslutz.com [Accessed March 4, 2011], to the effect that the intention of the legislator in describing the fines as administrative was to make clear that the European Community does not unduly claim a criminal law competence.
160. The Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, [2007] OJ C303/17, explanation on art.52: "Articles where the meaning is the same as the corresponding Articles of the ECHR, but where the scope is wider: ⋯ - Article 47 (2) and (3) corresponds to Article 6 (1) of the ECHR, but the limitation to the determination of civil rights and obligations or criminal charges does not apply as regards Union law and its implementation. " This appears to state that the guarantees of art.6 (1) of the Convention are available in administrative matters more readily and more broadly than under the Convention.
161. See Société Stenuit v France (1992) 14 E. H. R. R. 509 ECtHR.
162. See also the conclusions reached by the ECJ in Hüls v Commission (C-199/92 P) [1999] E. C. R. I-4287;
163. [1999] 5 C. ML. R. 1016 at [150]
164. and Montecatini SpA v Commission (C-235/92) [1999] E. C. R. I-4539;
165. [2001] 4 C. M. L. R. 18 at [176];
166. Wils contends that competition law fines are merely quasi-criminal like other civil infringements. See W. Wils, "The combination of the investigative and prosecutorial function and the adjudicative function in EC antitrust enforcement: A legal and economic analysis" (2004) 27 World Competition 8;
167. Wils, "The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review and the European Convention on Human Rights" (2010) 33 World Competition 12.
168. The procedural problems are discussed and possible solutions proposed in Forrester, "Due Process in EC Competition Cases" (2009) 34 E. L. Rev. 817.
169. Dubus SA v France (5242/04) June 11, 2009 ECtHR.
170. Jussila v Finland (2007) 45 E. H. R. R. 39 at [43]: "it is self-evident that there are criminal cases which do not carry any significant degree of stigma. There are clearly 'criminal charges' of differing weight. Tax surcharges differ from the hard core of criminal law; consequently, the criminal-head guarantees will not necessarily apply with their full stringency (see Bendenoun and Janosevic, § 46 and § 81 respectively, where it was found compatible with Article 6 § 1 for criminal penalties to be imposed, in the first instance, by an administrative or non-judicial body: a contrario, Findlay v the United Kingdom, cited above)."
171. See Wils, "The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review and the European Convention on Human Rights" (2010) 33 World Competition 12.
172. Janosevic v Sweden (2004) 38 E. H. R. R. 22 ECtHR at [81] "The tax authorities are administrative bodies ⋯ Contracting States must be free to empower tax authorities to impose sanctions like tax surcharges even if they come to large amounts ⋯ [provided that there is an appeal to] a judicial body that has full jurisdiction, including the power to quash in all respects, on questions of fact and law, the challenged decision ⋯."
173. Öztürk v Germany (1984) 6 E. H. R. R. 409 ECtHR at [56] (internal citations omitted): "Conferring the prosecution and punishment of minor offences on administrative authorities is not inconsistent with the Convention provided that the person concerned is enabled to take any decision thus made against him before a tribunal that does offer the guarantees of Article 6."
174. Jussila v Finland (2007) 45 E. H. R. R. 39 at [43].
175. Albert and Le Compte v Belgium (1983) 5 E. H. R. R. 533 ECtHR at [29] (emphasis added). This case concerns disciplinary sanctions (suspension of medical licence) imposed on two doctors, Dr Albert and Dr Le Compte. The Court held that although these were disciplinary actions, the applicants were entitled to have their cases heard by a "tribunal" satisfying the conditions laid down in art.6 (1): "In many member States of the Council of Europe, the duty of adjudicating on disciplinary offences is conferred on jurisdictional organs of professional associations ⋯ either the jurisdictional organs themselves comply with the requirements of Article 6 para. 1(art. 6-1), or they do not so comply but are subject to subsequent control by a judicial body that has full jurisdiction and does provide the guarantees of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) ".
176. Schmautzer v Austria (1996) 21 E. H. R. R. 511 ECtHR at [25]-[26], [36];
177. see also Le Compte v Belgium (1982) 4 E. H. R. R. 1 ECtHR at [51]. In Schmautzer the applicant was stopped by the police while driving his car because he was not wearing his safety-belt. In a "sentence order" the federal police authority imposed on him a fine of 300 Austrian schillings with 24 hours' imprisonment in default of payment, for an offence under the Motor Vehicles Act. The fact that the penalty was criminal was not disputed by the Austrian Government. The Court held that there was a violation of art.6 since the applicant was not heard by a tribunal of "full jurisdiction". The Court set out the defining characteristics of a "judicial body that has full jurisdiction". See also Ravon v France (18497/03) February 21, 2008 ECtHR.
178. Le Compte v Belgium (1982) 4 E. H. R. R. 1 at [51] (internal citations omitted); "⋯ the 'right to a court' and the right to a judicial determination of the dispute cover questions of fact just as much as questions of law. Yet the Court of Cassation does not have jurisdiction to rectify factual errors or to examine whether the sanction is proportionate to the fault. It follows that Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) was not satisfied unless its requirements were met by the Appeals Council itself."
179. See also Schmautzer v Austria (1996) 21 E. H. R. R. 511 at [36].
180. Kyprianou v Cyprus (2007) 44 E. H. R. R. 27 ECtHR at [44] (emphasis added).
181. Obermeier v Austria (1991) 13 E. H. R. R. 290 ECtHR.
182. See also, on the subject of limited judicial review (no "contrôle de pleine jurisdiction" in a tax case), Silvester's Horeca Service v Belgium (47650/99) March 4, 2004 ECtHR. By contrast, Bryan v United Kingdom (1995) 21 E. H. R. R. 342 ECtHR, a planning matter was regarded as a "typical example of the exercise of discretionary judgment in the regulation of citizens' conduct", and there had been no breach of art.6 (1).
183. Tsfayo v United Kingdom (2009) 48 E. H. R. R. 457 ECtHR.
184. Crompton v United Kingdom [2010] 50 E. H. R. R. 36 ECtHR.
185. See also Savino v Italy (17214/05, 20329/05, 42113/04) April 28, 2009 ECtHR, concerning the rights of employees of the Italian Parliament, which was held not to be an independent tribunal for purposes of art.6 (1).
186. See, for example, National Grid Plc v Gas and Electricity Markets Authority [2009] CAT 14 at [208]-[220];
187. further comprehensive review on the merits by Richards L. J. in the Court of Appeal, National Grid Plc v Gas and Electricity Markets Authority [2010] EWCA Civ 114;
188. [2010] U. K. C. L. R. 386 at [90]-[115].
189. See also Sepia Logistics Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2007] CAT 13;
190. Umbro Holdings Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2005] CAT 22;
191. Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v Director General of Fair Trading [2002] CAT 1;
192. Argos & Littlewoods v Office of Fair Trading [2005] CAT 13.
193. Napp [2002] CAT 1 at [499].
194. Compagnie des gaz de pétrole Primagaz v France (29613/08) December 21, 2010 ECtHR.
195. See Vitamins (T-15/02) [2006] E. C. R. II-497;
196. BASF v Commission (Choline chloride) (T-101/05 and T-111/05) [2007] E. C. R. II-4949;
197. [2008] 4 C. M. L. R. 13.
198. "Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?": Edward, First Baron Thurlow (1731-1806), quoted in J. C. Coffee Jr, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment" (1980) 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386.