Hysteresis effects of changing the parameters of noncooperative games

Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics

Volumn 85, Issue 3, 2012, Pages

  Wolpert, David H ^a,d   Harré, Michael ^b,e   Olbrich, Eckehard ^c   Bertschinger, Nils ^c   Jost, Jürgen ^a,c,f,g  

^a SANTA FE INSTITUTE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

^c MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR MATHEMATICS IN THE SCIENCES   (Germany)

^d CENTER FOR NONLINEAR STUDIES   (United States)

^e UNIVERSITY OF SYDNEY   (Australia)

^f NASA AMES RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

^g UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HYSTERESIS EFFECT; NONCOOPERATIVE GAME; RATIONAL GAMES; STATISTICAL PHYSICS; TAX RATES;

GAME THEORY; TAXATION;

HYSTERESIS;

EID: 84858266821     PISSN: 15393755     EISSN: 15502376     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.85.036102     Document Type: Article

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