Beliefs in conditionals vs. conditional beliefs

Topoi

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 115-132

  Leitgeb, Hannes ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Belief; Belief revision; Conditional; Conditionalization; Ramsey

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248369850     PISSN: 01677411     EISSN: 15728749     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11245-006-9003-7     Document Type: Article

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