Decision Theory and Rationality

Decision Theory and Rationality

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 1-198

  Bermúdez, José Luis ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Choice; Decision problem; Preference; Rational action; Rational behavior; Utility

Indexed keywords

EID: 84856583339     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548026.001.0001     Document Type: Book

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