Of acting principals and principal agents: goal incongruence in the venture capitalist-entrepreneur relationship

International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business

Volumn 7, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 367-388

  Christensen, Esben ^a   Wuebker, Robert ^b   Wüstenhagen, Rolf ^c  

^a European Energy A S   (Denmark)

^b RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF ST GALLEN   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

agency theory; case study; cleantech; energy technology; entrepreneurship; goal incongruence; information asymmetry; start up firm; VC; Venture Capital

Indexed keywords

EID: 84856001355     PISSN: 14761297     EISSN: 17418054     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1504/IJESB.2009.023025     Document Type: Article

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47. ‘Alpha Inc.’ is a fictitious name. The true name of the company cannot be disclosed due to confidentiality agreements.