Capital growth in a global warming model: Will China and India sign a climate treaty?

Economic Theory

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 411-443

  Dutta, Prajit K ^a   Radner, Roy ^b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

China and India; Climate change; Climate treaty; Dynamic games

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855996075     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: 14320479     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0590-6     Document Type: Article

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