Causal explanation and fact mutability in counterfactual reasoning

Mind and Language

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 55-85

  Dehghani, Morteza ^a   Iliev, Rumen ^b   Kaufmann, Stefan ^b  

^a University of Southern California ^*  (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855824854     PISSN: 02681064     EISSN: 14680017     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2011.01435.x     Document Type: Article

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