Does conditionality work? A test for an innovative US aid scheme

European Economic Review

Volumn 56, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 138-153

  Öhler, Hannes ^a   Nunnenkamp, Peter ^b   Dreher, Axel ^a,c,d,e  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

^b KIEL INSTITUTE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY   (Germany)

^c UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG   (Germany)

^d CESifo ^*  (Germany)

^e KOF SWISS ECONOMIC INSTITUTE   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Corruption; Foreign aid; MCC effect; Millennium challenge corporation

Indexed keywords

AID FLOW; CORRUPTION; INTERNATIONAL AID; MILLENIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 84855204146     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2011.05.003     Document Type: Article

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