Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 74, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 184-207

  Halpern, Joseph Y ^a   Pass, Rafael ^a  

^a Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

Regret minimization; Solution concepts

Indexed keywords

EID: 84855195828     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.012     Document Type: Article

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