Joint action and development

Philosophical Quarterly

Volumn 62, Issue 246, 2012, Pages 23-47

  Butterfill, Stephen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84455205704     PISSN: 00318094     EISSN: 14679213     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.00005.x     Document Type: Article

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