Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics

Nous

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 355-393

  Ludwig, Kirk ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 60949265731     PISSN: 00294624     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00652.x     Document Type: Article

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