Hybridizing jurisdiction

California Law Review

Volumn 99, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 1439-1484

  Dodson, Scott ^a  

^a The College of William and Mary   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84255182442     PISSN: 00081221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (248)

1. 6 U. S. (2 Cranch) 126(1804).
2. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 702(1982) (setting out characteristics of subject-matter jurisdiction).
3. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514(1868).
4. See Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1(2008).
5. Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U. S. (2 Cranch) 126, 126(1804).
6. See Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionatism, 93 VA. L. REV. 1829, 1839-40(2007).
7. See Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before FinaUudgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 511(1967).
8. Compare United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625, 630(2002) ("[An] elastic concept of jurisdiction is not what the term 'jurisdiction' means today, e.g., the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.") (internal quotation marks omitted), with infra text accompanying notes 70-81 (describing the more elastic historical concept).
9. Peny Dane, Jurisdictionaly, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4(1994).
10. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 135(2008) (characterizing the statute of limitations in the Tucker Act as a "more absolute" bar).
11. See Cotton, 535 U. S. at 630 (characterizing jurisdiction as "the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case");
12. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 91(1915) (characterizing jurisdiction as "power");
13. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514(1868) ("Jurisdiction is power to declare the law....");
14. Lawrence Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 22(1981) ("The concept of subject-matter jurisdiction in our legal system refers to the motive force of a court, the root power to adjudicate a specified set of controversies.").
15. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 455(2004) (referring to jurisdiction as "a court's adjudicatory authority");
16. Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 1613, 1617(2003) (rejecting a definition of "power" and instead characterizing jurisdiction as a facet of "authority").
17. See Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 55, 59(2008) ("As 'power,' jurisdiction embodies societal values, such as federalism, separation of powers, and a limited national government.").
18. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 577(1999);
19. see also Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382(1884) (same).
20. See McCardle, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) at 514;
21. Mayor v. Cooper, 3 U. S. (6 Wall.) 247, 250(1867) ("If there were no jurisdiction, then there was no power to do anything but to strike the case from the docket.").
22. Dan B. Dobbs, The Decline of Jurisdiction by Consent, 40 N. C. L. REV. 49, 49(1961).
23. Day v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 198, 205(2006) (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 213 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We have repeatedly stated that the enactment of time-limitation periods such as that in § 2244 (d), without further elaboration, produces defenses that are nonjurisdictional and thus subject to waiver and forfeiture.").
24. See, e.g., Cook v. United States, 246 F. App'x 990, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) ("[J]urisdictional rules are mandatory; therefore, their time limits cannot be waived.").
25. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 242 F. App'x 209, 210 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) ("[T]ime limits not imposed by statute are not jurisdictional. The specific implication is that these time limits may be waived.") (citations omitted);
26. Cook, 246 F. App'x at 994 ("[C]laim-processing rules are not jurisdictional-thus, their time limits can be waived.") (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted);
27. E. King Poor, Jurisdictional Deadlines in the Wake of Kontrick and Eberhart-Harmonizing 160 Years of Precedent, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 181, 207 n. 172(2007) ("The importance of the distinction [between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional characterizations] was that non-jurisdictional deadlines are subject to equitable exceptions, described as 'waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.'")
28. (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 455 U. S. 385, 393(1982)).
29. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 207(2007).
30. 28 U. S. C. § 2107 (a) (2006).
31. Sowles, 551 U. S. at 207.
32. 28 U. S. C. § 2107 (c).
33. Sowles, 551 U. S. at 207.
34. 28 U. S. C. § 2107 (c).
35. Bowles, 551 U. S. at 214 ('Today we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.").
36. For some of that criticism, see Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. Russell, 43 TULSA L. REV. 631(2008)
37. and Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionality and Bowles v. Russell, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42(2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2007/ 21/.
38. Bowles, 551 U. S. at 216-18 (Souter, J., dissenting).
39. See Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384, 387(1964) per curiam) (reaffirming the "unique circumstances" doctrine)
40. overruled by Bowles, 551 U. S. at 214;
41. Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215, 217(1962) (per curiam) (recognizing the "unique circumstances" doctrine)
42. overruled by Bowles, 551 U. S. at 214.
43. Recent cases suggest that the Court may be open to a more nuanced approach. In Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197(2011), the Court phrased the question presented as whether the 120-day deadline at issue had "jurisdictional consequences." That might be an implicit acknowledgment that even a nonjurisdictional rule could have jurisdictional effects. However, the Court did not pursue this possibility, instead falling back on the question whether the deadline is jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional. Concluding that the deadline is nonjurisdictional, the Court stated that it does not have jurisdictional attributes, but the Court did not explain why. It appears that the Court simply fell back into the dichotomy.
44. See Scott Dodson, Two Cheers for Henderson, CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FED. COURTS BLOG (Mar. 2, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2011/03/ commentary-two-cheers-for-henderson.html.
45. In Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct 2594(2011), the Court held § 157 (b) (5) of the Judicial Code to be nonjurisdictional and then engaged in a separate (though relatively perfunctory) analysis as to whether the provision was waivable. The Court concluded that it was waivable, however, and thus dropped the provision entirely into the nonjurisdictional basket Still, these cases suggest that the Court is becoming more receptive to nuanced, as opposed to binary, characterizations.
46. Cf. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 457 n. 12(2004) (noting that a debtor and creditor may not be able to consent to time-barred claims that would prejudice other creditors).
47. See Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S. 12, 19(2005) (calling them "inflexible").
48. 28 U. S. C. § 2254 (b) (3) (2006) ("A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.").
49. See, e.g., Day v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 198, 206-07(2006) (referring to a habeas petitioner's procedural default under the nonjurisdictional independent and adequate state grounds doctrine).
50. See id. at 9-10. An example might be the sixty-day notification period of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6972 (b) (1), which the Supreme Court has classified as "mandatory" without resolving its jurisdictional status.
51. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U. S. 20, 25-31(1989).
52. 42 U. S. C. § 1997e (a).
53. See Jones v. Block, 549 U. S. 199, 211(2007).
54. See Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594(2011) (recognizing this virtue of waiver).
55. See Pope v. United States, 323 U. S. 1, 14(1944) ("Jurisdiction to decide is jurisdiction to make a wrong as well as a right decision. ");
56. For more on the legitimacy effects of procedure, see Lawrence Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181(2004).
57. Nonjurisdictional bankruptcy rules, for example, may properly be nonwaivable by a creditor if other creditors' interests will be affected. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 457 n. 12(2004) (acknowledging this point).
58. For more on the value of legitimate authority, see generally Joseph Raz, Legitimate Authority, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979).
59. See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207, 1253-54(2001) ("So, too, courts of equity defined their own subject matter jurisdiction by developing unique substantive defenses to the enforcement of rights created at common law.").
60. See BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PECULIAR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 126(1880);
61. JAMES GOULD, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS 300(1832).
62. See, e.g., Hartog v. Memory, 116 U. S. 588, 590(1886) ("Neither party has the right... without pleading at the proper time and in the proper way, to introduce evidence, the only purpose of which is to make out a case for [jurisdictional] dismissal."). This was not necessarily a consistent position between 1875 and 1936, when the Court went through a transition period regarding jurisdictionality.
63. See, e.g., Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U. S. 315, 326-29(1889) (allowing a party's otherwise tardy jurisdictional challenge).
64. For a seminal article on the topic, see Dobbs, supra note 14. For an authoritative modem treatment, see KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVTL PROCEDURE §§ 4.4, 5.1 (2d ed. 2009).
65. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 270 U. S. 266, 274(1925) ("Every court of general jurisdiction has power to determine whether the conditions essential to its exercise exist.");
66. RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1580 (4th ed. 1996) ("A federal court always has jurisdiction to decide whether it has jurisdiction. ").
67. See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258(1947) (holding that a court has jurisdiction to issue lawful injunctions to preserve the status quo while the jurisdictional issue is being decided).
68. See Note, Res Judicata and Jurisdiction: The Bootstrap Doctrine, 53 HARV. L. REV. 652(1940). The term was made famous by Dobbs, supra note 14.
69. For a recent exploration of the doctrine, see Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 317-18(2011).
70. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U. S. 106, 115(1963).
71. Perhaps the first case articulating this principle was McCormick v. Sullivant, 23 U. S. (10 Wheat) 192, 199(1825) (holding that a judgment was res judicata even if issued without subject-matter jurisdiction).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12, at 115(1982) ("When a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the judgment precludes the parties from litigating the question of the court's subject matter jurisdiction in a subsequent litigation except [under certain conditions].").
73. See Chicot Cnty. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S. 371, 376(1940) ("[Federal courts'] determinations of [whether they have jurisdiction to hear a case] may not be assailed collaterally.");
74. Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165, 171(1938);
75. See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U. S. 433(1940) (allowing collateral attack under the Bankruptcy Act);
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12, at 115(1982) (setting out three exceptions); Clermont, supra note 87, at 318 (acknowledging that a jurisdictional ruling will not preclude relitigation "in special circumstances, such as where the court plainly lacked subject-matter jurisdiction or where the judgment substantially infringes on the authority of another court or agency").
77. Preclusion law is judicially created. See Dan B. Dobbs, Trial Court Error as an Excess of Jurisdiction, 43 TEX. L. REV. 854, 882-90(1965).
78. Preclusion is a nonjurisdictional affirmative defense. See FED. R. Crv. P. 8 (c). Thus, the operative effect of "jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction" is established only by the invocation of the preclusion defense by a party, and it may be avoided by a party's waiver or forfeiture of the defense.
79. See Durfee v. Duke, 375 U. S. 106, 113-14(1963) ("It is just as important that there should be a place to end as that there should be a place to begin litigation. After a party has his day in court, with opportunity to present his evidence and his view of the law, a collateral attack upon the decision as to jurisdiction there rendered merely retries the issue previously determined.") (quoting Stall, 305 U. S. at 172); see also Dobbs, supra note 14, at 499 (calling it "quite a valuable tool in stopping wasteful litigation").
80. Heather Elliott, Jurisdictional Resequencing and Restraint, 43 NEW ENG. L. REV. 725(2009);
81. Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal Courts, 87 ORNELL L. REV. 1(2001);
82. Peter B. Rutledge, Decisional Sequencing, 62 ALA. L. REV. 1(2010).
83. See Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake Mich. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 382(1884) ("Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause."); see also Collins, supra note 12, at 1830-31 (calling jurisdiction a "first principle").
84. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U. S. 83, 94-95(1998) ("The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States and is inflexible and without exception. ");
85. cf. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514(1868) ("Jurisdiction is power to declare the law.").
86. See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U. S. 422, 431(2007) (allowing dismissal under the forum non conveniens doctrine without first establishing subject-matter jurisdiction);
87. cf. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 583-88(1999) (allowing dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction without first establishing subject-matter jurisdiction);
88. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U. S. 591, 612(1997) (calling class certification determinations "logically antecedent" to Article III standing issues).
89. See Sinochem, 549 U. S. at 431 ("Jurisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the merits.");
90. RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1412 (6th ed. 2009) ("If the record fails to disclose a basis for federal jurisdiction, the court must suspend determination of the merits of the controversy unless the failure can be cured.") (emphasis added).
91. Colo. River Water Cons. Dist v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817(1976);
92. see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U. S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404(1821) ("We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution. ").
93. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N. Y. U. L. REV. 543, 545(1985) ("[S]uggestions of an overriding obligation, subject only and at most to a few narrowly drawn exceptions, are far too grudging in their recognition of judicial discretion in matters of jurisdiction. ");
94. see also Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction's Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 990(2009) (discussing abstention in the context of jurisdictional obligation).
95. see Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L. J. 99, 103-04(1986);
96. Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L. J. 71(1984).
97. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 501(1975). For discussions of prudential standing, see FALLON ET AL., supra note 101, at 128-29;
98. William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L. J. 221, 251-53(1988).
99. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 702(1982) ("The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. III, but from the Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest."). The traditional conceptualization of personal jurisdiction, of course, was one of governmental power and territorial sovereignty.
100. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 720(1877) ("The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum, as has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse.")
101. abrogated by Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310(1945).
102. For a recent discussion of the doctrine, see A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617(2006).
103. See Ins. Corp., 456 U. S. at 703-04 (discussing both express and implied waiver);
104. FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (h) (1) (providing for waiver of the personal jurisdiction defense).
105. See Dane, supra note 17, at 65 ("[I]magine a time limit that... did explicitly provide that it would not apply in the event of excusable neglect. Is there anything that would prevent the line so drawn from being jurisdictional? Admittedly, it would be a complicated, even difficult, jurisdictional line. But many jurisdictional lines are complicated and difficult."); Scott Dodson, Appreciating Mandatory Rules: A Reply to Critics, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 225, 229-30(2008), http:/Avww.law.northwestem.edu/lawreview/Colloquy/2008A7 (making a similar point).
106. Another example might be 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (c) (2006), which allows district courts discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. I discuss § 1367 (c) in more detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 214-227.
107. 28 U. S. C. § 2107 (a).
108. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 214(2007) ("Today we make clear that the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.").
109. 28 U. S. C. § 2107 (c).
110. 394 U. S. 977(1969).
111. 28 U. S. C. § 2101.
112. Teague v. Reg'l Comm'r of Customs, 394 U. S. 977, 977, 981(1969) (Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
113. A related example is Justice Douglas's dissent from a denial of certiorari in Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ, 402 U. S. 962, 962-64(1971) (arguing that the certiorari deadline should be excused for a petition filed one day late because the petition would have been timely if not lost by the courier).
114. Teague, 394 U. S. at 982-83 (Black, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
115. Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat) 537, 539(1824) ("It is quite clear, that the jurisdiction of the Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted by subsequent events.").
116. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U. S. 83, 94-95(1998) ("The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States and is inflexible and without exception. "). On the other hand, the rule allows a federal court to hear a case in which jurisdiction was established at the time of invocation even if subsequent events would destroy jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying note 126.
117. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L. P., 541 U. S. 567, 583-84(2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court has long applied Marshall's time-of-filing rule categorically to postfiling changes that otherwise would destroy diversity jurisdiction. ");
118. St Paul Mercury Indent Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283, 294-95(1938) ("It uniformly has been held that in a suit properly begun in the federal court the change of citizenship of a party does not oust the jurisdiction. The same rule governs a suit originally brought in a state court and removed to a federal court"); id. at 289-90 ("Events occurring subsequent to the institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction. "). There are exceptions to this general rule, of course.
119. See, e.g., 28 U. S. C. § 1447 (e) (2006) (authorizing remand after a post-removal joinder that destroys subject-matter jurisdiction).
120. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U. S. 61, 73(1996)
121. (interpreting 28 U. S. C. § 1441 as embodying the time-of-removal rule);
122. cf. 28 U. S. C. § 1446 (b) (providing for removal when an amended pleading makes clear that the case "has become removable").
123. 519 U. S. 61(1996).
124. Id. at 75. Despite the nonjurisdictional status of the time-of-invocation rule, not all of its manifestations are overcome by this combination of factors. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Grp., L. P., 541 U. S. 567, 574(2004) (refusing to shift the rule for post-invocation changes of citizenship of a continuing party).
125. Other cases have held similarly. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U. S. 826, 836-38(1989) (correcting a time-of-filing flaw in an original diversity action);
126. Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U. S. 699(1972) (correcting a time-of-removal flaw);
127. Baggs v. Martin, 179 U. S. 206, 209(1900) (curing a time-of-filing defect);
128. cf. Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U. S. 6, 16(1951) (expressing the same principle in dictum).
129. See Grupo Dataflux, 541 U. S. at 574-75 ("Unless the Court is to manufacture a brandnew exception to the time-of-filing rule, dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is the only option available in this case.").
130. See also Mark A. Hall, The Jurisdictional Nature of the Time to Appeal, 21 GA. L. REV. 399, 410(1986) ("[N]otice of appeal timing limitations simply impose a mandatory precondition to acquiring appellate jurisdiction-").
131. 28 U. S. C. § 2107 (a) (2006).
132. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U. S. 244, 245(1992) (treating an appellate brief as a "notice of appeal" for purposes of Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure).
133. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U. S. 266, 268(1988).
134. 28 U. S. C. § 1291 (a) (2006). Another "finality" rule governs Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state-court decisions and admits of some exceptions despite its jurisdictional nature.
135. See 28 U. S. C. § 1257 (a);
136. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Conn, 3420 U. S. 469, 479-83(1975).
137. For a discussion of these finality requirements in the context of jurisdictional clarity, see Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1(2011).
138. For criticism of the collateral-order rule, see Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B. C. L. REV. 1237(2007).
139. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541, 546(1949) (defining the collateralorder doctrine as "that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated");
140. see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 690-921(1974) (holding an order rejecting a claim of executive privilege to be appealable).
141. FED. R. CIV. P. 54 (b).
142. 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b). One could interpret this as a form of statutory incorporation of hybridization instead of a precondition, in that § 1292 (b) creates an exception to the finality requirement of appellate jurisdiction that is grounded in judicial discretion. My thanks to David Shapiro for prodding me on this point
143. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241, 1246(2010) (holding the registration requirement of the Copyright Act to be a precondition to suit);
144. Jones v. Block, 549 U. S. 199, 216(2007) (holding exhaustion to be a mandatory but nonjurisdictional precondition to suit);
145. Zipes v. TWA, 455 U. S. 385, 393(1982) (holding the limitations period for filing a Title VII lawsuit to be a nonjurisdictional precondition to suit).
146. See Pinion v. Dow Chem., U. S. A., 928 F.2d 1522, 1525 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1991) 1 ("As mandatory preconditions to our exercise of jurisdiction, however, filing rules like Rule 4 (a) are 'jurisdictional' in the sense that, absent compliance, we can acquire no jurisdiction of the cause even if it is otherwise within our competence.");
147. cf. Smith v. Barry, 502 U. S. 244, 248(1992) ("Although courts should construe [the 'notice' requirement] liberally when determining whether it has been complied with, noncompliance is fatal to an appeal.").
148. 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (c).
149. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 541 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J.).
150. 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (a).
151. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514(2006) (calling the amount-incontroversy requirement "an ingredient of subject-matter jurisdiction").
152. These terms are akin to what Michael Pardo calls "procedural accuracy" and "material accuracy" and to what Robert Summers calls "formal legal truth" and "substantive truth." Michael S. Pardo, Pleadings, Proof, and Judgment: A Unified Theory of Civil Litigation, 51 B. C. L. REV. 1451, 1470(2010);
153. Robert S. Summers, Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in Judicial Fact-Finding-Their Justified Divergence in Some Particular Cases, 18 LAW & PHIL. 497, 498(1999).
154. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U. S. 283, 288-89(1938) ("The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith.... It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.").
155. Cf. Brittain Shaw Mclnnis, Comment, The $75, 000.01 Question: What is the Value of Injunctive Relief?, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013, 1018-19(1998) (stating that the diversity statute provides no guidance on how to value equitable relief for purposes of the amount-in-controversy requirement so that the plaintiffs evaluation will usually control).
156. For a recent application of the principle that some contestation is required to enable scrutinization of the jurisdictional facts, see Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 543 (7th Cir. 2006) (Easterbrook, J.) ("None of Meridian's jurisdictional allegations was contested, so the standard of proof is irrelevant").
157. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U. S. 1178, 189(1936) ("If his allegations of jurisdictional facts are challenged by his adversary in any appropriate manner, he must support them by competent proof. And where they are not so challenged the court may still insist that the jurisdictional facts be established or the case be dismissed, and for that purpose the court may demand that the party alleging jurisdiction justify his allegations by a preponderance of evidence."). This burden can be difficult for defendants justifying removal in the face of a complaint that lacks an allegation for sum-certain relief.
158. See Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in Controversy Cannot Be Determined from the Face of Plaintiff's Complaint: The Need for Judicial and Statutory Reform to Preserve Defendant's Equal Access to Federal Courts, 62 MO. L. REV. 681, 683-85(1997) (explaining and discussing those difficulties).
159. For a different view, see Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973, 1008-09(2006) (arguing that when jurisdictional facts going to the amount-in-controversy determination overlap with the merits, merely a prima facie standard applies to establish the jurisdictional facts).
160. See Jerome B. Grubhart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U. S. 527, 537-38(1995) ("Normal practice permits a party to establish jurisdiction at the outset of a case by means of a nonfrivolous assertion of jurisdictional elements, and any litigation of a contested subject-matter jurisdictional fact issue occurs in comparatively summary procedure before a judge alone.").
161. See FED. R. EVTD. 101 (applying the Rules to "proceedings" in federal courts);
162. FED. R. EVID. 1101 (d) (providing for exclusions that do not mention jurisdictional determinations);
163. Meridian Security, 441 F.3d at 541 (asserting that the proof must be founded upon "admissible evidence");
164. cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541(2011) ("doubt[ing]" that normal evidentiary rules do not apply in the analogous scenario of class certification).
165. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 103 (requiring contemporaneous objections that are waived if not made); id. 408 (excluding offers to compromise as evidence in certain circumstances).
166. To go even one step deeper, nonjurisdictional discovery procedures and mechanisms control parties' access to jurisdictional discovery for use in the proof stages. For a comprehensive analysis of jurisdictional discovery, see S. I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489(2010).
167. See 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (c) (2006) (establishing requirements for corporate citizenship for diversity purposes).
168. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct 1181, 1193(2010).
169. Potentially yes. See Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 541 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that a defendant can prove jurisdiction using "contentions interrogatories or admissions in state court").
170. See, e.g., McDevitt v. Guenther, 522 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1284-86 (D. Haw. 2007).
171. Other courts have allowed the evidence, but primarily under a recognized exception to the Rule as opposed to on grounds that the Rule does not apply to jurisdictional hearings at all. See, e.g., McPhail v. Deere & Co., 529 F.3d 947, 956 (10th Cir. 2008).
172. See Wetmore v. Rymer, 169 U. S. 115, 120-21(1898) (noting the lack of congressionally prescribed procedures and stating that such an absence reflected an intention to delegate the adoption of such procedures to the courts).
173. For a seminal treatment of these topics, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593(1992) (cataloguing variants of clear-statement rules and the levels of clarity required for each).
174. See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399(2010) (arguing that clear-statement rules are inappropriate as constitutional prophylaxes).
175. See Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1245(2010) (analyzing whether the Copyright Act's registration requirement "clearly states" that it is jurisdictional);
176. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515-16(2006) ("If the Legislature clearly states that a threshold limitation on a statute's scope shall count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the issue. But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.") (citation omitted). These are statutory-coverage examples. For a discussion of the Arbaugh clear-statement rule in a procedural context, see Dodson, supra note 20, at 66-71. Other examples of presumptions and clearstatement rules abound, particularly in the jurisdiction-stripping context
177. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557(2006) (imposing a clear-statement rule for legislation purporting to strip judicial review over executive-detention decisions);
178. Calcano-Martuiez v. INS, 533 U. S. 348, 351(2001) (refusing to read statute as stripping original habeas jurisdiction absent clear statement).
179. For commentary, see James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court's Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433,
180. Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 46 (supporting the use of clear-statement rules for jurisdiction stripping in detention cases).
181. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. 205, 209-11(2007) (holding the appellate deadline to file a civil notice of appeal to be jurisdictional despite the lack of express indication of jurisdictionality).
182. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1040-41(1983) (presuming, absent a clear statement, that the state-court decision rests upon an independent and adequate state ground, and that the state court decided the issue according to federal law, thereby rendering the decision appealable to the U. S. Supreme Court). The independent and adequate state-law ground is a component of appellate jurisdiction.
183. * (1992).
184. See Arbaugh, 546 U. S. at 515 (adopting a clear-statement rule because of the threat of "unfairness" and "waste of judicial resources").
185. See Long, 463 U. S. at 1041 ("In this way, both justice and judicial administration will be greatly improved.").
186. For an excellent and extended treatment of state sovereign immunity, see CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972).
187. U. S. CONST, amend. XI.
188. Compare Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1657-58(2011) ("For over a centuiy now, this Court has consistently made clear that federal jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.") (internal quotation marks omitted)
189. and Monaco v. Mississippi, 6292 U. S. 313, 320(1934) (stating that state sovereign immunity is a restriction on jurisdiction)
190. with Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, 677-78(1974) (stating that state sovereign immunity "sufficiently partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar")
191. and Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U. S. 261, 267(1997) (calling it "a sovereign immunity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the Judiciary's subject-matter jurisdiction");
192. cf United States v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U. S. 506, 513-15(1940) (holding a judgment entered against the United States without its consent to be void for lack of jurisdiction under federal sovereign immunity).
193. See, e.g., Bradford C. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. Rev. 1817, 833(2010) ("Similarly, the Amendment is framed as a restriction on '[t]he Judicial power' and therefore limits all forms of jurisdiction recognized by Article III.").
194. For an argument that some facets of state sovereign immunity are components of personal jurisdiction, see Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559(2002) (characterizing Eleventh Amendment immunity as subject-matter jurisdiction and residual sovereign immunity as personal jurisdiction).
195. For a characterization of federal sovereign immunity as a "jurisdictional defense," see Hydrogen Tech. Corp. v. United States, 831 F.2d 1155, 1162 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1987).
196. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U. S. 436, 447(1883) ("The immunity from suit belonging to a State... is a personal privilege which it may waive at pleasure-");
197. see also Sossamon, 131 S. Ct at 1658 ("A State, however, may choose to waive its immunity in federal court at its pleasure.");
198. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 535 U. S. 613, 620(2002) (holding that a state's voluntary removal to federal court waives Eleventh Amendment immunity).
199. See Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 159-60(1908) (allowing such a suit);
200. Some theorize Young as a component of immunity rather than an exception to it, but that is not the way the current Court views it Compare Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 28(1963)
201. with Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct 1632, 1642(2011) (calling the Young doctrine an "exception" to state sovereign immunity).
202. See Wis. Dep't of Coir. v. Schacht, 524 U. S. 381, 394(1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that "courts need not raise the issue sua sponte"); Dodson, supra note 7, at 28-29 (explaining why state sovereign immunity need not be policed sua sponte).
203. The parallels between the two, at least outside the context of the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment, are striking. See Schacht, 524 U. S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that "the immunity bears substantial similarity to personal jurisdiction requirements"); Nelson, supra note 191 (arguing that non-Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity is a doctrine of personal jurisdiction).
204. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U. S. 1, 11(2004).
205. The Court has been somewhat clearer that ripeness is a jurisdictional component of Article Ill's ban on advisory opinions. See, e.g.. Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U. S. 289, 297(1979);
206. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U. S. 59, 82(1978).
207. But see Meridian Sec. Ins. Co. v. Sadowski, 441 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2006) (claiming that ripeness is not a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction);
208. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 167(1987) (arguing normatively against a jurisdictional characterization).
209. 375 U. S. 301, 306 n. 3(1964).
210. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U. S. 305, 317-18 & n. 5(1988) (considering a mootness argument not raised by any party and for the first time on appeal);
211. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 7(1998) ("This case-or-controversy requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings - The parties must continue to have a 'personal stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit") (citation omitted);
212. Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562, 573 & n. 49(2009) (detailing the precedent);
213. Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 612(1992) (explaining that the Liner dictum "was broadly accepted in subsequent Supreme Court opinions").
214. See, e.g., United States v. Juvenile Male, 131 S. Ct. 2860, 2865(2011) (reaffirming the characterization of the "capable of repetition but evading review" doctrine as an "established exception to mootness");
215. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189-93(2000) (discussing "the long-recognized exceptions to mootness").
216. Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 692(1990) ("If mootness is an article III requirement, then how can the Court create broad exceptions based on the desire to facilitate judicial review...?"); Hall, supra note 201, at 562-64, 584-85 (making the same point).
217. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 490(1996). (Pubitemid 126408822)
218. Honig, 484 U. S. at 330 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring);
219. U. S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U. S. 388, 411(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Since the question is one of power, the practical importance of review cannot control.").
220. Geraghty, 445 U. S. at 398-401.
221. De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316(1974).
222. There is some support for this definitional characterization in the cases. See, e.g., United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629, 632(1953) (stating that voluntary cessation "does not make the case moot").
223. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L. J. 1363, 1384(1973).
224. I am aware that the Court disclaimed this description of mootness in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 28 U. S. 167, 190(2000).
225. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125(1973);
226. see also U. S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P'ship, 513 U. S. 18, 21(1994) ("[A] case must exist at all the stages of appellate review.").
227. 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (c) (2006) (setting out guidance for the exercise of such discretion).
228. See Camegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U. S. 343, 350-51(1988) (holding pendent claims constitutional).
229. 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (c) (3).
230. Carlsbad Techs., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct 1862, 1863-65(2009).
231. The Court previously had held that a district court may remand, rather than dismiss, supplemental jurisdiction claims that had been removed from state court to federal court. See Cohill, 484 U. S. at 357.
232. Carlsbad, 29 S. Ct. at 1867. The Court thus held the remand order appealable despite § 1447 (d) 's bar on such review. The appealability of remand orders at issue in Carlsbad has generated significant controversy. For a review of that controversy and the powerful argument that mandamus should be used to review remand orders rather than exceptions to § 1447 (d)
233. see James E. Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand Orders: Reasserting the Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 493(2011).
234. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U. S. 706, 711-12(1996). Abstention doctrines allow federal courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction for a variety of reasons, many of which are within their discretion. See Shapiro, supra note 105, at 574-88.1 note that Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) jurisdiction has a similar discretionary provision. See 28 U. S. C. § 1332 (d) (3) (providing that a district court "may, in the interests of justice and looking at the totality of the circumstances, decline to exercise jurisdiction" over certain class actions).
235. Carlsbad, 129 S. Ct. at 1867 (reasoning that because the declination is discretionary, it is nonjurisdictional).
236. 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (c).
237. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U. S. 715, 726(1966);
238. see also 28 U. S. C. § 1367 (c) (setting out bases for discretionary decline of jurisdiction).
239. Compare Gibbs, 383 U. S. at 726 (encouraging consideration of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants")
240. with Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U. S. 61, 75(1996) (shifting the time-of-invocation rule for reasons of "finality, efficiency, and economy").
241. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 12 (h) (deeming waivable objections to service); id 12 (a) (1) (A) (ii) (deeming service waivable).
242. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 328-30(1976) (characterizing it as a jurisdictional precondition).
243. See Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d 1091, 1093 (4th Cir. 1982) (discussing the precondition).
244. See 28 U. S. C. § 7422 (setting out the requirements for filing an action for a refund);
245. United States v. Baggot, 463 U. S. 476, 478-79(1983) (interpreting the statute to require prepayment of the assessment).
246. For a similar argument, see Perry Dane, Sad Time: Thoughts on Jurisdictionality, the Legal Imagination, and Bowles v. Russell, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 164, 167-68(2008), http://colloquy.law.noruiwestem.edu/rnain/2008/ 01/sad-turie-though.html.
247. See Hall, supra note 135, at 419 ("[I]f a procedural rule protects interests larger than those of the immediate parties, if there are greater societal concerns at stake, then waiver may not be appropriate. In such cases, the immediate parties' cognizance of the error is not an adequate proxy for the degree of societal harm. The interests that are prejudiced by the defect may outweigh the harms to judicial efficiency caused by delay in raising the defect."); cf. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 379-83(1942) (making the analogical point that the waivability of evidentiary objections or admissions ought not apply in non-adversarial administrative proceedings).
248. See Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1457, 1460(2006) ("I argue that if a rule operates to shift authority from one law-speaking institution to another in the case of compliance, and is premised on a policy decision that compliance makes that institution more proper for resolution of law than another, then the rule can justifiably be treated rigidly.").